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The Korean peninsula has been a focus of contention since the nineteenth 
century.  Following the division of the peninsula after World War II, the issue of 
when, and how, Korea will be reunified has been a subject of intense interest, 
one that has been encouraged of late by the end of the Cold War, the extreme 
economic weakness of North Korea, and the decision by the North to pursue a 
nuclear option.  Although war failed to unify the peninsula in 1950-1953, the fear 
is that a desperate communist regime may once again attempt to unify the 
peninsula by force.  A second scenario for unification envisions the implosion of 
an economically debilitated regime in the North.  Finally, a peaceful reunification 
through diplomacy constitutes a third scenario.  
The dilemma is that, although reunification is intensely desired by the 
Korean people, the United States, the PRC, Japan, and Russia prefer a 
continuation of the status quo.  The attitude of Korea’s neighbors and strategic 
partners is important especially because reunification under whatever scenario 
will undoubtedly require support, both diplomatic and economic of the 
surrounding powers.  This thesis examines the various scenarios for Korean 
reunification and their implications for the international relations in Northeastern 
Asia.  It concludes that the collapse of the political system in the North Korean 
state will initiate reunification.  As a result of this, China will play the greatest role 
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I. KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Koreans date the birth of their nation to 2333 BC when the first great ruler 
of Korea, Tan'gun Wang'gom, united the six tribes in the northern part of the 
peninsula.  Legend holds that Tan’gun is the descendent of Hwan-in, king of the 
eastern heavens, and Ung-yo which means "the girl incarnated from a bear."  
Tan’gun would call his kingdom Chosun which means "Land of the Morning 
Calm," "Land of the Dawn," or "Land of the Morning Freshness”.1  He established 
his capital at Asadal, today Pyongyang, where he taught his people lessons of 
government, marriage, agriculture, and religion.  The Tan’gun legend has 
provided spiritual comfort to modern day Koreans during times of crisis.  While a 
story of a god-like creature who desires to become a man is considered mere 
legend to many Westerners, this mythological story bolsters the Korean belief 
that their nation is an ancient one.2  By the first century B.C., three kingdoms 
emerged on the Korean Peninsula and part of what is now known as Manchuria:  
Koguryo (37 B.C. - A.D. 688), Paekche (18 B.C. - A.D. 660) and Shilla (57 B.C. - 
A.D. 935).3  Together they form the beginning of the Korean nation. 
It is the long history of the Korean people and their ancient beginnings 
which acts as a bond, whether they are separated by an international boundary 
or not.  The Korean peninsula has been divided for more than fifty years against 
the wishes of its people.  Countries which had also been partitioned after World 
War II have all reunified save two, the PRC and Taiwan and North and South 
Korea.  Two entirely different systems in North and South Korea have not been 
able to come to a conclusion as to which method of reunification should be used.  
On 4 July 1972, the North-South Joint Communiqué stated that reunification 
                                            
1  Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun:  A Modern History, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1997), 23.  
2  Ibid., 24.  
3  John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, ed. East Asia Tradition and 
Transformation, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 1027.  
2 
should be attained independently without external imposition, it should be 
attained by peaceful means, and finally, it should be attained on a basis that 
transcends differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.4   
Despite the joint communiqué stating that Koreans will be independent, 
historically Korea has been a pawn of powerful neighbors.  Korea is described as 
a “shrimp among whales”.  The “whales” in 19th and early 20th century history 
were China, Russia, and Japan.  These were joined by the United States in 
1945.  It is self evident that each of these powers holds a different and at times 
conflicting view toward Korean reunification.  The United States, for instance, has 
been disposed to be positive towards Korean reunification although there is no 
policy in place to speed it up.  The United States fears that reunification would 
end its special security tie with South Korea.  An end to this relationship might 
mean the end of forward stationed military bases and the end of American 
influence in a key part of Asia.  China, on the other hand, regards reunification 
with apprehension for entirely different reasons.  China views North Korea as a 
“useful buffer zone that contributes to their national security.”  It also enjoys a 
thriving economic relationship with South Korea.  Chinese political scientist 
Chae-jin Lee answers that Beijing has “no compelling reason to push for Korea’s 
immediate political reintegration, even by peaceful means.”5  Japan also has 
shown some apprehension about reunification of the peninsula as it would pose 
greater economic and diplomatic challenges to them.  Lastly, while Russia does 
not oppose the benefits which would befall their nation upon reunification, they 
do not want to see the rise of a new regional power on its border at a time of 
domestic turmoil.6  At the very least, these four powers have contradictory 
attitudes toward reunification.  The major assumption among all of them is that 
the South will gradually integrate the North.  However, reunification may happen 
                                            
4  Byong Hong Kim, "Korean Reunification," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 
38, no. 2, The China Challenge: American Policies in East Asia (1991): 115.  
5 Quoted in Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Reunification," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 
(Mar/Apr 1997): 78.  
6  Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Reunification," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 
1997): 78. 
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more rapidly and as a result of a war or a Northern collapse.  It is impossible for 
the four powers to postpone discussions about reunification until after it occurs.  
Both North and South Korea understand that reunification will seriously challenge 
the status quo in Northeast Asia.  According to the Korea Institute for National 
Unification (KINU)   
The second-term Bush Administration will continue to push forward 
a foreign policy in the Northeast Asian region based on the general 
outline of anti-terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), and spreading American values… China 
will counter US unilateralism and Japanese ambitions to become a 
military power through multilateralism and security cooperation with 
Russia. It will also try to enhance its status in Northeast Asia by 
taking a role as mediator in the North Korean nuclear issue… 
Russia will use its strategic alliance with China to curb US 
unilateralism and strategy of pre-emptive strikes. Russia will also 
utilize energy development in Siberia and the Far Eastern region to 
regain influence within Northeast Asia.7 
Koreans are aware of the impact their reunification will have on Asian 
security.  There is already a delicate balancing act among the four powers to 
exert influence over the Koreas.  In preparation for reunification of the peninsula, 
China, Russia, Japan, and the United States should realize that their actions will 
go a long way in deciding what kind of influence they will have over Korea and 
the Northeast Asian region.  The scenario under which Korea unites will 
undoubtedly determine which country will have the majority of influence over the 
peninsula.  The nations’ policies that are implemented before unification will 
make the greatest impact on how the unified Korea will react to them. 
B. POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION SCENARIOS 
1. Reunification as a Result of War 
North Korea continues to threaten South Korea, Japan and the rest of the 
Asian region with the threat of their nuclear arsenal.  At the end of April 2005 the 
North test fired a short range missile into the Sea of Japan setting off alarms for 
the Six-Party nations.  North Korea’s unchecked nuclear capabilities threaten the 
U.Ss-Japan alliance and serve as a reminder that reunification might come about 
                                            
7 “Outlook for the International Affairs and Inter-Korean Relations in 2005”, [available online] 
http://www.kinu.or.kr; last updated July 30, 2005. 
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on the Korean peninsula as a result of war or conflict.  In one case the North 
Koreans could decide to show their aggression and finally reunite the peninsula 
under their terms.  Missile delivered chemical attacks on ROK ports and U.S. 
logistics nodes would delay the reinforcements that would be coming from the 
West Coast of the United States and Japan.  This strategy would give them time 
to conquer Seoul and replenish their supply lines while also firing Nodong or 
Taepodong missile attacks at Japan.8   
In another scenario, many small destabilization campaigns could be 
carried out in the South without actually resorting to a full-scale war.  These 
campaigns could be in the form of psychological operations tailored for South 
Korea or Japan, support for radical student movements through financial support, 
changing of public attitudes on unification and security, and disinformation 
campaigns through the media.9  In a third case the United States and its allies 
could preempt any action that Kim Jong-il might take and end the DPRK’s 
nuclear program as well as his tyrannical regime before nuclear weapons are 
used against the United States or Japan.  Unification by this outcome would most 
likely yield heavy casualties and exorbitant costs.  The DPRK has proven that 
their missiles can reach as far as the Japanese mainland.  If any action led to a 
war with the North Korean regime, Japan along with South Korea would suffer 
dire consequences to infrastructure and economy. 
2.   Reunification as a Result of the DPRK’s Collapse 
The collapse of the North Korean regime should be looked at as the 
“inability of the regime in power to maintain effective political, economic, social, 
and political control, which ultimately leads to its dissolution and, in the extreme 
case, the formal end of the state”.10  During the 1990s, it was widely believed 
that the North Korean economy through famine and economic mismanagement 
                                            
8  "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea," in CSIS International Security 
Program [database online]. Washington, D.C. August 2002 [cited 2005], [available online]  
9  Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification Scenarios and 
Implications, (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1999), 69.  
10  Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification Scenarios and 
Implications, (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1999), 59.  
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would collapse and send the regime toppling.  Years have passed and while the 
North Korean people are still starving and suffering from lack of medical 
treatment, the regime is still present.  It is more likely that if a regime collapse 
were to occur, it would happen as a result of power struggles by factions within 
the DPRK.11  Many experts assume that the North Korean system has 
persevered for so long because of the people’s belief in juch’e.  The former Great 
Leader of North Korea, Kim Il-Sung, officially proclaimed the juch’e ideology on 
December 1955.  According to Kim, juch’e means “the independent stance of 
rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own powers, believing in 
one’s own strength and displaying revolutionary spirit of self-reliance”.  Juch’e 
was designed to highlight a “Korea centered” revolution, inspire pride and 
identity, and mold a focus of solidarity on Kim and the governmental party. 12 
Under the new and improved Juch’e idea, the population of North Korea must 
give all love and power to the Kim family.  “Closely aligned to Juch’e is a nearly 
holy writ that the Kim family must one day rule the Korean peoples on both sides 
of the demilitarized zone”.13  The death of Kim Jong-il and the consequential 
assumption of leadership of a non kinsman “Kim” in the North might trigger a 
collapse of the system   
There are three different variations of a collapse that could be considered:  
“a collapse that results in the dissolution of the ruling regime, with a successor 
regime managing to retain political and military control; a collapse where political 
instability is rampant and where the successor regime is unable to establish or 
retain effective governing authority led either by the party, the bureaucracy, or 
the military; and a collapse that could precipitate some type of conflict – internally 
in the form of limited military clashes with existing governing authorities or 
externally in terms of border clashes with the South or more extensive military 
                                            
11  "Northeast Asian Security After Korean Reconciliation Or Reunification - Preparing the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance,"  Summary Report, p. 8,  
12 North Korea, Political ideology: The role of the Chuch’e (June 1993) [database online]; 
available from Library of Congress Country Studies. 
13 Robert Marquand, “Sustaining N. Korea’s Cult of Kim,” Boston (Mass.) Christian Science 
Monitor, 16 January 2003, 01. 
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operations directed against the ROK”.14  It is difficult to predict which variation 
might actually occur, but there are several characteristics which are common to 
all of the variations.  First, a triggering event could initiate the collapse with little, 
if any, advance warning.  The event could fall between the two extremes of mass 
disorder that force a change or a “crumbling” down from above.  This event 
would probably be the result of a coup.  Second, some form of international 
intervention into the North would be necessary to restore order.  Intervention 
could be in the form of a U.S.-ROK joint action or under UN leadership.  Third, 
high priority measures would need to be taken to control masses of population 
for labor migration and refugee processing through the borders.15  A collapse of 
North Korea has been compared to what happened between East and West 
Germany.  Although the two Germanys offer a historical analogy there are a 
great number of differences between the Germanys and the Korean peninsula.  
For instance, the two Germanys were able to have a semi-normal diplomatic 
relationship for two decades before unification.  The Koreas have yet to initiate 
their diplomatic relationship.  Also, East Germany was never in the vast state of 
economic upheaval from which North Korea suffers.  West Germany was in a 
much better economic position than South Korea and yet, after unification they 
still had to be supported for many years by external aid and foreign investment.  
As noted in a RAND corporation study, “the process will prove far more 
tumultuous within the region than German reunification has proved in Europe.  
Moreover, the emergence of a unified, economically strong Korea could bring on 
a new era of competition to replace the tensions of the Cold War, centered on the 
possible advent of intense economic and diplomatic rivalry with Japan and the 
revival of historical suspicions of China and Russia.”16  International intervention 
will be necessary to restore order to the North.  Should the Japan-United States 
                                            
14  Pollack and Lee, "Preparing for Korean Unification Scenarios and Implications," 59.  
15  "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea," in CSIS International Security 
Program [database online]. Washington, D.C. August 2002 [cited 2005], [available online] 
16  Chae-Jin Lee, "U.S. and Japanese Policies Toward Korean Reunification," in U.S.-Japan 
Partnership in Conflict Management - the Case of Korea The Keck Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, 1993), 143.  
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alliance provide the multinational force that will be needed after North Korea falls, 
the two nations will have more influence along the peninsula in deciding the 
political and economic aspects of reunified Korea. 
3. Reunification as a Result of Inter-Korean or Multilateral 
Diplomacy 
Seemingly the most preferred option for reunification on the Korean 
peninsula is peaceful and gradual integration between the two Koreas.  A rapid 
reconciliation could be worrisome and chaotic to the North Korean regime.  
Without sufficient time to address key issues such as the DPRK’s missile and 
WMD capabilities as well as gaining consensus within the North’s political elite, 
the whole process could fail resulting in the “hard landing” or collapse scenario.17  
However, if the proper time was taken to reconcile most differences through a 
“gradual reconciliation”, the outcome would be more desirable. Prior to 
reunification, there must be the presence of seven traits:  initial acceptance of the 
status quo by the two Koreas and the four major powers; mutual diplomatic 
recognition along the two-plus-two model; a formal peace treaty; a protracted 
period of peaceful coexistence; greater interaction between the two Koreas 
(mostly economic); slow structural change evolving into a “one country, two 
systems, and a two governments” approach; and eventual unification.18  
Unification under these peaceful terms requires that there no longer be a military 
or nuclear threat against one another and there must be integration on the 
military and economic side.  Under the new auspices, a unified Korea would have 
to renegotiate all previous accords with the two Koreas and the international 
community.19  This would be a lengthy process which might change previous 
relationships with China, the United States, and Russia.  Moreover in a peaceful 
and integrated reunification, the Korean people and their new government will 
have more power to set up and to choose their alliances. 
                                            
17  Ibid., 10.  
18  "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea," in CSIS International Security 
Program [database online]. Washington, D.C. August 2002 [cited 2005], [available online] 
19  Pollack and Lee, "Preparing for Korean Unification Scenarios and Implications," 59.  
8 
The two Koreas are currently on the path of inter-Korean and multilateral 
diplomacy for purposes of reunification of the peninsula.  The one major factor 
which has slowed progress for the past decade has been North Korea’s inability 
to terminate its nuclear program.  On February 14, 2003, a broadcast from the 
Korean Central News Agency, a state-owned and run television news service, 
stated that the North Koreans had withdrawn from the Agreed Framework and 
reactivated their nuclear facilities in direct response to the threat that they felt 
from U.S actions.20  Since North Korea has made this proclamation, the Four 
Powers (United States, China, Japan, and Russia) along with South Korea and 
North Korea began collective discussions to end the nuclear program in August 
2003.  Since the opening rounds, the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing have only 
met four times and were adjourned as of early August 2005 without an 
agreement.  Discussions started once again on September 14, 2005 after a five 
week hiatus in which North Korea and the United States continued the talks 
during back-channel discussions.21  As of the conclusion of this paper, an 
agreement was reached for North Korea to stop building nuclear weapons and 
allow entrance to international inspections in exchange for energy aid, economic 
cooperation and security assurances.22  Even though this new policy has been 
agreed upon, the Six Party Talks will resume in November 2005 to discuss 
implementation.  Until international inspectors have seen the North Korean 
nuclear plants, Pyongyang will still be able to continue their nuclear weapons 
program.   Until North Korea terminates its nuclear program, inter-Korean and 
multilateral discussions cannot continue to reunify the peninsula. 
                                            
20 Paul Kerr, "North Korea Restarts Reactor; IAEA sends resolution to UN," Arms Control 
Today 33, no. 2 (Mar 2003). 
21 Joseph Kahn, “North Korea Talks Resume, Still in a Standoff,” New York Times, Sep 14, 
2005, p. A6. 
22 “North Korea pledges to halt nuke programs,” MSNBC News Service, Sep 19, 2005, 
[available online] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9375104/ 
9 
II. CAN JAPAN OVERCOME HISTORY TO REGAIN 
INFLUENCE OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA  
A. JAPANESE AND KOREAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLONIAL 
PERIOD 
The Korean people experienced years of hardship and suffering at the 
hands of their Japanese occupiers during the years 1910-1945.  The complete 
surrender of the Japanese during World War II finally liberated the Korean people 
from Japan’s militaristic control.  Korean history shows that Japan was not the 
only nation to seek the benefits offered by the Korean peninsula’s location.  From 
1895 till 1905 (only 10 years) Korea would be caught between China, Russia, 
and Japan as they each tried to gain leverage over the peninsula and 
consequently gain trade and resource advantages.  The Yi monarch, the ruling 
Korean government at the time, believed the foreigners that were competing for 
influence on the peninsula could be controlled.  By using the foreigners against 
one another Korea’s independence could be preserved.23  Korea, a “younger 
brother” in the “tributary relationship”, also depended on their past alliance with 
China to provide them with security.  Since China’s own borders were vulnerable 
to British and Russian powers as well as the rapidly industrializing Japan they 
could not save the Korean peninsula.24  China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1895 proved to Korea that they were unable to protect them from the 
Japanese.  Japan went even further to establish their control over the Korean 
peninsula when they defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.  
Korea sought the aid of the Western powers but received no help from the United 
States or Britain.  The United States did not want to interfere with Japan’s power 
over the Korean peninsula.  This policy was spelled out in the Taft-Katsura 
Agreement of 1905 which stated a mutual recognition of Japan’s new territory on 
                                            
23  Chae-Jin Lee, "U.S. and Japanese Policies Toward Korean Reunification," in U.S.-Japan 
Partnership in Conflict Management - the Case of Korea The Keck Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, 1993), 4.  
24  "The Japanese Occupation of Korea:  1910-1945," in The Korea Society [database 
online]. New York, NY [cited 2005], Available from 
http://www.koreasociety.org/KS_curriculum/HS/2/2-text/2_062.htm 
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the peninsula.25  Korea would fall hopelessly to Japan while foreign powers 
watched. 
Japan ruled over Korea during the occupation in the same manner with 
which they gained control over the peninsula.  They expanded their influence in 
Korea by assassinating some members of the Korean ruling family.26  As these 
ruling authorities died off, Japanese military officials stepped in to assume the 
government power.  In 1910 Tokyo declared the formal annexation of Korea and 
renamed it “Chosen”, a Japanese pronunciation of the Korean “Chosun”.  The 
thirty-five year occupation of the Korean peninsula went through several phases.  
At the beginning, the occupation has been recorded as somewhat benign.  It was 
believed that early in the occupation the Korean nationalists might actually take 
control of the peninsula.  Consequently, Japan dominated the Korean people 
with only a single division with a few added regiments.  Upon the rumored 
assassination of the last Korean king, the nationalist movement spread and 
gained more support.27  The result of the movement was the March 1919 
uprising which was suppressed by the Japanese military.  The Koreans that were 
sympathetic to and participants in the independence movement were arrested 
and imprisoned.  The benign treatment from the Japanese turned harsh and 
cruel.   Many Koreans died as a result of beatings, torture, or horrible prison 
conditions.28  Following this uprising, the Japanese increased their military 
presence with two divisions to maintain a tight control over the peninsula.  The 
Japanese forces occupying the Korean nation would number a quarter of a 
million by 1937.29  Without the help of foreign nations, Koreans would not be able 
to gain their own independence. 
The Japanese believed that they were modernizing Korea and providing 
them with opportunities they otherwise would not have had.  The rest of the world                                             
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now sees the occupation in Korea as well as China as less benevolent than the 
Japanese had originally claimed.  Tokyo’s naisen ittai policy, Japan and Korea as 
single body, would force Koreans to worship at Shinto shrines, to be educated in 
the Japanese language in Korean schools, and take on compulsory Japanese 
names while discarding their Korean ones.30  Once the Korean peninsula was 
part of the Japanese empire, Japan believed that Koreans should live with all 
things Japanese.    Early on in the occupation Japan had claimed religious 
tolerance. However, thousands of Presbyterian Church leaders were arrested, 47 
leaders were shot or beaten to death, and 12 churches were destroyed following 
the 1919 Independence movement.31  Shinto beliefs such as worship of the 
Japanese Emperor and his ancestors were forced on the Korean people.  The 
Japanese feared that worship in other religions would stir up another revolt 
against the occupiers.  Education served as another problem since Korean 
students were discriminated against in favor of Japanese students.  Korean 
children were taught skilled job training rather than the higher education that was 
stressed to the Japanese.  By the 1930s all students were taught in Japanese.  
Japan maintained most of the nation’s natural resources for their use.  In 1945, 
Japan held 85% of all the property in Korea and 83% of that property was owned 
by the Japanese government or zaibatsus.32  It was in 1940 that Koreans were 
told to give up their family name and take on Japanese names.  To coerce the 
Koreans to do this they were told that the Korean children could not go to school 
and the adults could not get jobs until their names were changed.  Another major 
insult Japan paid to Korea was to take both their men and women in support of 
the war in the Pacific against the Allied Powers.  The Korean men were coerced 
to comply with the draft by threatening their families.  Through conscription, there 
would be 50,000 Korean men in the Japanese army by the year 1945.33  The 
women were also given “jobs” and taken to the front lines of the war.  Korean 
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women were offered jobs and then taken to the Japanese army where they were 
to act as prostitutes.  These women who were used against their will were 
referred to as “comfort women”.  Some of these women were beaten while others 
were so ashamed that they could never come back to their families and homes.  
This issue is still fresh in the minds of the Koreans as reparations are being 
requested for these women who suffered so greatly.   
Japan’s history with the Korean peninsula during the colonial period 
shows how cruelly and despicably they treated the Korean people.  The Korean 
people and their culture were believed to be inferior to that of the Japanese way.  
This reign of harsh treatment would finally end with the unconditional surrender 
of the Japanese to the Allied Powers.  Only recently have the leaders of Japan 
admitted their wrongdoings during the occupation and apologized to South Korea 
for their actions.  A reunified Korea will always be wary of Japan gaining more 
military power and once again dominating the Asian region.  While Korea has 
begun to forgive Japan’s actions, they will never forget what has happened to 
them.  Based on their history, Japan must make great amends politically and 
economically to gain more influence with a reunified Korea.   
B. HISTORY AFTER KOREA’S DIVISION 
Following Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allies, colonization 
ended and a long difficult road between Japan and the two Koreas began.  The 
Syngman Rhee administration in South Korea from 1948 to 1960 was very pro-
United States but anti-Japan.  Because of this, normalization talks which had 
begun in 1952 with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) were very lengthy.  It 
was not until President Park Chung-hee took over and emphasized Korean 
industrialization and economic growth that economic and diplomatic relations 
with Japan were reestablished.  Normalization talks were finalized in 1965 when 
Japan established diplomatic relations with the ROK.34  Following the 
normalization, Japan has helped South Korea become more economically and 
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militarily powerful than North Korea through economic assistance.35  North Korea 
and Japan began their normalization talks in January 1991, however there was 
little progress that was made since North Korea’s nuclear program and abduction 
of Japanese citizens halted the talks.36  Japan still has not normalized diplomatic 
relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) despite their 
“policy of virtual equidistance between South and North Korea for the purpose of 
maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula.”37 
 The relation of Japan and the two Koreas has for obvious reasons 
remained frictional as a result of Japan’s infiltration and 35 year occupation of the 
Korean peninsula.  Japan is responsible for millions of Chinese slaughtered, 
millions of Koreans being enslaved, and tens of thousands of women being 
forced to provide sexual services to the Japanese troops.  Although Japanese 
leaders have apologized for their actions their sincerity is questionable for many 
reasons:  Japanese textbooks in Tokyo gloss over Japanese actions and 
atrocities, the dominating party in Japan’s government has, as a group, 
supported nationalists and former war criminals, and the official version of the 
war guilt (which has been endorsed by the United States) is blamed on a small 
militarist clique who hijacked the Japanese government during the War.38  Both 
North and South Korea share with China in asking Japan to truthfully record their 
historic mistreatment in textbooks.  Koreans fear that if Japan does not actively 
confess and apologize for their past wrongs, they may, in the future, repeat their 
savagery.  More practically, however, is that Japan must continue to accept 
responsibility for their conduct in the war before they can take their position in 
Asian discussions of security including Korean reunification.  They will need to 
make a future apology to the North Koreans as well, once diplomatic relations 
are established. 
                                            
35  Yoshinori Kaseda, "Japan and the Korean Peace Process," in The Korean Peace Process 
and the Four Powers (England: Ashgate, 2003), 119.  
36  Ibid., 119.  
37  Lee, "U.S. and Japanese Policies Toward Korean Reunification," 130.  
38  "Japan Apologizes," New York Times, Aug 16 1995, p. A.24. 
14 
Relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula have more recently 
centered on the return of the abducted Japanese citizens’ remains.  North Korea 
has admitted to abducting thirteen Japanese people in the 1970s and 1980s in 
order to help train their spies.39  North Korea claims that five of them were 
repatriated and the other eight were dead.  Japan recently received the 
supposed remains of two of the abductees; however, when DNA testing was 
done it showed that it was not the remains of the kidnapped Japanese citizens.  
This has outraged the Japanese and led to a call for possible sanctions in the 
Japanese government.  In February 2004, the government passed legislation 
that would allow Japan to impose sanctions without the approval of a UN 
Security Council resolution.40  Japanese sentiment is now shifting toward 
sanctions as well since 63 percent of citizens and 83 percent of the Diet 
members are in favor of imposing economic sanctions.41    Sanctioning has been 
supported by the United States, yet disliked by the South Koreans.  In response 
to this issue, Japan temporarily froze their food aid to the DPRK.  They are 
cautious to resume any sanctions because, if their effectiveness is doubtful, it 
could cause Japan to lose opportunities for further negotiations.  Japan wants the 
abduction issue settled and will bring up the issue once again upon resuming the 
Six-Party Talks.  Both South Korea and North Korea have been outwardly 
against Japan bringing up such a topic in this forum.  According to the KCNA, 
“Japan has busied itself to divert the orientation and atmosphere for the six-party 
talks into those serving its mean interests.”42  Japan must be careful not to make 
relations with South Korea more complex by trying to resolve their current issues 
with North Korean abductions. 
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While Japan has, in the past, been one of the forerunners for providing 
economic trade and food assistance to North Korea, the DPRK has been 
adamant about wanting Japan out of the Six-Party Talks.  The North has 
believed the Japanese have an interest in expanding their region over the South 
Korean held Tokto islands.  They also believe that Japanese presence at the 
talks will do more harm than good if they are allowed to participate.43 Japan on 
the other hand has felt threatened by the North Koreans’ weapons development.  
In a Japanese Defense White Paper, their concern over the Korean peninsula 
was spelled out.   
 The Korean peninsula is inseparably related with Japan 
geographically and historically, hence the maintenance of peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula is of vital importance to the 
peace and stability of East Asian areas as a whole, including 
Japan.  Today on the Korean peninsula, military tension has 
continued to prevail with more than 1.4 million ground forces of the 
Republic of Korea and North Korea deployed against each other 
across the demilitarized zone (DMZ)… The situation on the Korean 
peninsula is still unstable and fluid.44 
The DPRK has test fired their long range and medium range missiles over the 
Sea of Japan to prove their military capabilities.  In May 1993 the DPRK test-fired 
a Rodong missile into the Sea of Japan and in August 1998 it was a Daepodung-
1 missile that went over mainland Japan.45  As a result, Japan feels threatened 
by North Korea’s nuclear program.  Their goal is to protect Japan from the 
North’s missiles and stop the development of the nuclear program.  They have 
continued to side with the United States in their position.  Because of this hard 
alliance with the United States, North Korea believes that getting Japan out of the 
Six-Party Talks will enhance their position at the six-party talks along with China 
and Russia’s help.  Diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Japan have 
certainly become worse in the last few years.  Because of this, Japan still 
maintains a close economic relationship with South Korea and works toward 
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more bilateral relations; yet must still tread lightly with any action toward the 
DPRK.  South Korea has adamantly cautioned Japan against imposing any 
sanctions while the North has blasted it.  Japan must maintain its relations with 
South Korea while addressing their security issues with the DPRK in the Six-
Party Talks.  They may need to place their abduction issues on standby until 
after discussions have yielded an end to the nuclear talks.  
C.   REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR 
1. Japanese Reaction to Aggression 
Japan’s position towards Korean reunification mirrors that of the United 
States.  They believe that they should maintain an engagement policy with North 
Korea that involves the cooperation of their allies, the U.S. and South Korea.  
Japan feels that reunification should come as a result of long diplomatic 
negotiations and not from either North Korean or American aggression.  While 
Japan does not have military forces that would be sent to the peninsula, they 
would support the American military forces with their “self defense forces” in the 
result of a war.  Japan would react negatively to any North Korean attack by 
supporting the U.S. and others fighting against them and more than likely support 
any U.S. preemptive action.  It is important to remember that Japan would 
directly feel any action that resulted in aggression on the peninsula.  As it was 
stated before, if the DPRK were to attack first in order to reunify the peninsula, it 
would not only hit targets on the South Korean side of the DMZ but Japan as 
well.  Many of the American forces that would be sent in defense of the ROK 
would be coming from Japan and the DPRK would consider them a priority 
target.  While the North’s conventional forces have deteriorated over the years 
from lack of funds, their ballistic missile capabilities as well as chemical and 
biological weapons have gradually strengthened over the years.46   If action were 
to be taken as a preemptive measure, it would be because both South Korea and 
Japan would have been threatened with the North’s nuclear weapons.  It would 
be in Japan’s interest to support American forces if the United States were to 
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attack the DPRK preemptively.  Supporting the United States and the South 
Korean governments would give Japan more leverage at the table when 
reunification talks begin.  
2.  Options for Japan 
Japan would be affected by the aggressive behavior of the DPRK as they 
put up their last defenses before falling.  Missiles would fly over the Sea of Japan 
and hit the cities of Japan.  Japan would maintain an alliance with the allied 
powers against the DPRK regime.  While Japanese might be affected on their 
own soil from the North Korean missiles, Japan probably would not send their 
Self Defense Forces to the peninsula.  Both United States and Chinese forces 
would have made their military prowess over the DPRK known by quickly ending 
any war and any action by Japan might scare North Koreans who remember the 
Japanese actions more than sixty years ago.  To support reunification, Japan 
would invest in the North and thereby encourage North Koreans to remain within 
their borders.   Most of this investment would be done by non-governmental 
organizations; however, Japan would facilitate the path for their businesses to 
invest in infrastructure projects such as energy generation, telecommunications, 
highways, ports, and railroads.47  They would also give food and medical 
supplies to the international organizations which would be alleviating the 
suffering of the North Korean people.  Japan must use their relations with the 
United States to support their actions during the aggression and afterwards.  In 
the event of any act of aggression on the peninsula, American forces would be 
called on to defend the South Korean half of the peninsula.  Initial external 
American forces would come from the U.S. bases stationed in Japan and then 
follow on forces would seek supplies from the Japanese islands.  Japan would 
support the action against the DPRK by assisting the American military. 
3.  Effects on Japan 
Japan would significantly feel the effects of a Korea reunified through 
aggression due to their proximity with the North and the range of their missiles.  
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Japan could suffer, once again, from the effects of any chemical or biological 
weapons.  Because they do not yet have a ballistic missile defense to defend 
against the threat of North Korean missiles, Japan would have to rebuild a 
portion of their destroyed infrastructure.  The cost to rebuild would take away 
from the assistance needed in the North.  A war-torn Japan would not have the 
necessary economic assets to invest in a reunified Korea.   
If they were hit with North Korean missiles, Japan, as a war participant, 
would have more of a say in reunification.  In other words, they would not only be 
at the “table” because of their alliance with the United States, but would 
legitimately and, perhaps more persuasively, be a part of any post-war 
discussions concerning Korean reunification.  An aggressive reunification could 
result in the powerful U.S. military maintaining their position on the peninsula as 
they rebuilt and unified the new nation.  This would be beneficial for the 
Japanese who would once again feel secure with the United States security 
umbrella.  Former North Korean defenses as well as their nuclear program would 
be monitored by United States and UN officials.  A great benefit from American 
forces retaining a check on the Korean military is that they would also keep the 
Chinese military under control with a presence on the Korean peninsula.  
Therefore, Japan would not need to further build-up their security defenses in the 
form of a greater military or in a nuclear program, both of which would threaten 
China in their own security.   
Another scenario might be that U.S. forces would be substantially reduced 
or removed from the peninsula if the Chinese had made an agreement with the 
U.S. prior to military action.48  The American forces might be there long enough 
with the aid of China to reestablish order and peace for a few years.  In this 
event, Japan would be without their security umbrella and might need to 
strengthen their military and start a nuclear program.  Again this would cause 
alarm in China and the reunified Korea as they recall Japan’s militaristic history. 
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D.   REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE DPRK’S COLLAPSE 
1.  Options for Japan 
Japan would support Korean reunification if there were a collapse of the 
DPRK in the North.  Just as Japan would provide the majority of their support 
through economic investments and aid in the war/aggression reunification 
scenario, so too would they use their investment opportunities in the event of a 
North Korean collapse.  Japanese assistance would be important during the 
unification process in order to solidify a ROK-led unification.  Only after closely 
coordinating with the ROK should Japan make investments in North Korea.  
Japan should make strides to inform the North Korean people of the positive 
aspects of a capitalist economy, spread the idea of democracy, and help them 
gain access to outside information.49  Japan’s support should also include 
assisting and training the people in technical skills such as agriculture, fisheries, 
light industry, and other special knowledge skill areas.50   
Another way in which Japan could support Korean reunification is to aid in 
the flow of refugees.  Refugees would be fleeing from the collapsing nation by 
the thousands into Russian and Chinese borders, as well as to the sea.  By close 
coordination with the U.S. Navy and South Korea, Japan would use their 
Maritime Self Defense Force to rescue the boat people and provide shelter on 
one of the islands in the Sea of Japan.51  Japan would, furthermore, support the 
United States and their military forces sent to the peninsula, to maintain order in 
the North or South.  Any interim government set up to maintain peace and order 
would be led by foreign intervention.  Japan would support the Washington’s 
stance on this interim government.  Either through supporting a North Korean 
who is anti-Kim or keeping Chinese officials out of power, Japan would sustain 
their position to have a unified Korea which is no longer a security threat to them. 
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2.  Effects on Japan 
Like the previous reunification scenario, Japan will need to invest more of 
their money into the Korean peninsula.  Money which would have otherwise been 
invested in their businesses will be redirected toward the peninsula.  More 
humanitarian and financial aid would be sent as well.  Another aspect of this 
reunification scenario is the question of who will fill the vacuum of leadership 
once the system collapses in the North.  If the void has been filled by militaristic 
followers of Kim who wish to announce their military prowess, then Japan should 
be wary of possible missile attacks or threats to their nation.  If China has 
stepped in to advise and assume a leadership position, their influence over 
reunification could be enough to scratch out Japanese participation.  China would 
have moved their own forces onto the border regions so that they could control 
the flow of refugees into their nation.  Wary of American military power so close 
to their borders, Chinese influence would also require that the U.S. forces be 
removed from the peninsula upon reunification.  The exit of U.S. forces would 
also mean the deletion of Japan’s security umbrella.  Linking the two powers 
would mean a greater direct security threat to Japan which, as of yet, has no 
capabilities to combat that danger to their homeland.  If these events were to 
occur, Japan could take a defensive posture in building both a defensive military 
and nuclear program of their own.   
E.   REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF INTER-KOREAN OR 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
1.   Options for Japan 
Japan wants an active role in the multilateral and inter-Korean relations for 
the purpose of reunification.  The best way that Japan can support the 
reunification under diplomatic terms and still maintain the maximum amount of 
influence over the peninsula is close trilateral policy coordination with the ROK 
and the United States before and after unification.  This coordination can shape 
the environment so there is no competition between China, Russia, South Korea, 
United States, and Japan.52  Japan has been working with the ROK together for 
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years as they have tried to open negotiations with the DPRK.  In order for Japan 
not to undermine inter-Korean relations and assist North Korea’s economic and 
military modernization, South Korea drew up five principles to guide them.  The 
five principles were: “Seoul and Tokyo should have close advance consultations; 
Japan should take into consideration ‘meaningful’ progress in the inter-Korean 
dialogue; Japan should not offer financial compensation to North Korea until their 
relations become fully normalized, and these compensatory funds should not be 
used to build up the North’s military power; North Korea should be encouraged to 
emerge from its isolation and pursue reforms; and Japan should urge Pyongyang 
to sign the agreement for international inspection of its nuclear facilities.”53  The 
relationship between Japan and Korea should make strides to move away from 
the historical animosity and towards a more positive identity.54  Effects would be 
minimized and it would help achieve the ROK-led unification if this close 
coordination were continued and extended to the United States.  The first 
necessary step with this security triangle is to closely coordinate with the other 
nations in order to dismantle the North Korean nuclear weapons program.   
Japan should follow the following levels for dismantling the nuclear 
weapons while closely consulting with the United States and ROK.  The first level 
is to continue the current diplomatic actions through the Six-Party Talks. If the 
Six-Party Talks continue to yield no result, then Japan will support a discussion 
of the nuclear program at the United Nations.  Chinese cooperation will be 
needed to resolve this issue; however, the trilateral group of nations should not 
depend on China so much that they then increase their influence over the 
peninsula during reunification.55  Offering North Korea more of the “carrot” and 
less of the stick through energy needs and establishing diplomatic relations might 
be sufficient to persuade the North to dismantle.  However, the North Koreans 
could see more benefits in maintaining their nuclear program than what Japan 
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and the other nations are able to offer them.  Some of the DPRK’s benefits 
include:  regime survival; enhancing national pride; negotiating withdrawal of U.S. 
forces; offsetting military inferiority to ROK/U.S. forces and possibly gaining 
superiority over the ROK; obtaining revenue by exporting nuclear devices and 
technology; and dissuading the United States from intervening on the Korean 
peninsula.56  If the first level of diplomatic efforts fails, the follow-on step is to 
initiate measures which will make Kim Jong-il think that the nuclear program no 
longer serves his long-term interests.  Measures can be taken such as economic 
sanctions, enhanced defense measures for their own citizens if U.S. military 
deterrence fails and North Korea decides to strike back, and a detailed plan for 
North Korea to agree to for dismantling its nuclear program.57   
Another significant way in which Japan will support the reunification of 
Korea is by extending assistance to the ROK in order to assure the ROK-led 
unification.  The U.S.-ROK relationship will be critical in Japan’s further 
assistance to Korea.  As long as U.S. forces are maintained on the peninsula and 
security ties between the United States and ROK are kept intact, Japan will 
uphold their investments.  If there is a clear sign that Korea will not unify under 
terms which are favorable to Japan, then it will become difficult for them to 
continue their financial assistance.  Japan will continue to support the two Koreas 
as they work toward a diplomatic solution with the aid of the United States and 
Japan.  They realize that China and Russia might play a role in the diplomacy as 
well, however, if they begin to take hold and sway multilateral talks too much in 
their favor, Japan will discontinue their backing. 
2.   Effects on Japan 
Japan would feel economic effects from this multilateral and inter-Korean 
diplomatic reunification just as it did with the other reunification scenarios.  The 
big difference in this scenario would be that more investments and aid would be 
given to the South and North Korean states even before national unification takes 
place.  Through this gradual reunification, Japan and the other nations’ 
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investments and financial assistance will bring North Korea toward a market 
economy.  This economy could continue to grow stronger and threaten Japan’s 
markets.  Korea could become an economic as well as diplomatic rival to Japan 
in the future, a less than desired effect.  Despite this possible outcome, Japan 
still must help finance Korean reunification so as to avoid a “harsh landing” which 
could have repercussions for Seoul, Tokyo, and the region overall.58 
Although Japan has some fears of an economically strong reunified Korea 
which would compete with them, it is the rise of Korean nationalism that panics 
them more.  A unified Korea could turn to China for assistance if an emotional 
conflict were to occur between Japan and Korea.  If U.S. influence were not there 
to curb Korea’s nationalism, it would be directed toward Japan and “the 
possibility of a unified Korea turning to China to counter Japan, and making 
efforts toward its own military build up, cannot be denied.”59  On the other hand, 
if the United States were to maintain their military and diplomatic influence over 
the peninsula, Japan would be able to maintain their sway as well.   
F. NATIONAL OPTIONS FOR JAPAN 
1.   Factors Which Will Shape a Future Korea 
Japan’s part in reunification has been largely because of the alliance with 
the United States.  While Japan can never attain a greater influence than the 
United States over the peninsula through supporting reunification, they need to 
overcome their history and become a more trusted supporter for Korea.  In order 
for Japan to do this, there are three major factors which need to be overcome 
and which will shape Japan’s policy toward reunification.  The first and most 
important factor to Japan and all nations involved is to dismantle the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program through diplomatic negotiations at the Six-
Party Talks.  These talks, should they bring about the eventual cessation of the 
nuclear program, could continue toward negotiating policy of unification.  Japan 
will need to justify their importance in these talks so that North Korea will not be 
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able to kick them out.  On July 20, 2005, just days before the fourth round of the 
Six-Party Talks were to begin; North Korea openly stated that they would not 
deal with Japan.  Japan had stated earlier that they wished to bring up the 
abduction issue when the talks resumed.  The South Korean Unification Minister 
had even agreed with the DPRK’s statements in asking Japan to refrain from 
adding other issues to the nuclear talks.60  Japan must drop their separate 
national issues in order to sustain their position in the Talks.   
A second factor which will shape future Korea is the involvement of China.  
If China is allowed to hold political sway over North Korea during the nuclear 
talks, they could use that to their advantage when reunification negotiations 
come around.  Lastly, the third factor is the removal of American forces from the 
peninsula.  Whether this is as a result of a decision made by the unified Korea, 
China, or even the U.S. themselves, the removal of the American military would 
mean a lack of security for Japan. 
2.   Best Case Scenario for Japan 
The ideal scenario for Japan is a multilateral and inter-Korean diplomacy 
that promotes reunification and gives Japan an advantage in the regional 
balance of power.  The following four elements would be focused on for a unified 
Korea:  the political and economic systems; its strategic choices; and its defense 
forces.61  Politically, Japan would best be served with a unified Korea which 
shares their political values.  Bilateral relations would be maintained and 
confidence between the two countries would grow exponentially if the unified 
Korea were to have a political system which shares the values of freedom, 
democracy, and rule of law.62  For the economic system, Japan would prefer a 
unified Korea to have a strong capitalist economy.  They currently have a strong 
trading relationship with the ROK which they would not like to lose.  Strategically, 
it would be beneficial if a unified Korea were to align with the United States and 
allow the American forces to be stationed on the peninsula.  This alliance would 
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create a security triangle which would secure Korea from unwanted authority by 
China or Russia.63  This would also benefit Japan.  Sustaining the American 
military in Korea means that Japanese security would be ensured.  The fourth 
element of Japan’s ideal scenario is the lack of defensive forces in unified Korea.  
Japan does not want Korea to possess “offensive weapons that could threaten 
Japan, such as medium-range ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and above 
all, nuclear weapons.”64  Lastly, any expansion of their naval capabilities would 
have to be coordinated through the United States.  Japan would have the most 
influence and diplomatic relationship with a Korea that unified under these 
elements. 
3.   Worst Case Scenario for Japan 
While Japan’s ideal scenario puts them in the best position in the region 
for political and economic influence, the worst case scenario needs to be looked 
at before any policy can be made.  In this scenario, reunification would come as 
a result of an aggressive war in which the North Koreans used a nuclear weapon 
to hold an advantage over the ROK military forces.  In this case, the reunification 
would be more rapid and not gradual enough for outside powers such as the 
Japan and U.S. alliance to “win” over the North Korean leaders. Some of the four 
elements from the ideal scenario will be used to describe this situation.  The 
political system would be under the North Korean control and not promote 
freedom and democracy.  With the possibility of Chinese assistance, Korea 
would disband the U.S.-ROK treaty, demand that American forces are withdrawn, 
and sustain the nuclear program.  Strategically in this scenario, unified Korea 
would ally itself with China so that its national power would exceed that of Japan 
and the United States.65  This alliance would threaten Japan directly.  The last 
element is unified Korea’s defense posture.  If Korea were to build up their 
military in conjunction with China while also maintaining the nuclear program, 
Japan would need to do the same.  An increase of Japanese forces might stir up 
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the region as thoughts of colonization rekindled their historical fears.  If this 
scenario would come to fruition, Japan would need to be in a defensive posture 
until one of the elements was changed. 
4.   Policy Approaches 
The previous years have shown that Japan has almost no role to play in 
unification issues such as the North-South dialogue, arms control and 
disarmament, and the peace treaty conclusion.  Japan understands that the 
future reunification should be administered by Koreans but recognizes that they 
have a great stake in the outcome.  Reunification will cause Japan to rethink their 
national security, defense posture, and prosperity overall.66  They need to start 
developing policy approaches to help ensure that their interests are met when 
unification finally comes around.   The first step in developing a policy is for 
Japan to declare support for Korea’s unification.  This could be accomplished by 
setting up “think tanks” which discuss and develop Japanese strategy for helping 
Korea unify.  Through their actions, Japan will provide Koreans with evidence 
that they support their actions.  Japan will, however, first need to dismantle the 
North Korean nuclear program.  They should do this through a trilateral joint 
action with the ROK and the United States.  It should start with the diplomatic 
efforts that are ongoing with the Six-Party Talks and move on toward other efforts 
such as economic sanctions.  The second step in developing Japanese policy is 
to provide significant economic assistance to the peninsula during and after the 
unification process.  This assistance will go a long way toward positively 
influencing the Korean people’s perception of Japan as well as building up the 
economy in the north.  The third step in developing Japanese policy should be to 
exercise restraint with their Self Defense Force.67  Japan will cultivate a trusting 
relationship with Korea by not acquiring offensive weapons.  A fourth step is to 
ensure a long-term alliance by establishing multilateral frameworks for security 
dialogues.68  These frameworks will contribute to the reduction of Japanese-
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Korean friction.  The last step of policy development is to address the history 
issues.  Japan’s actions in history were horrendous and, to make matters worse, 
they have recently glossed over the atrocities through their statements in 
textbooks and visits by the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni shrine (a shrine 
dedicated to the fallen men of the Japanese military).  By setting up an official 
program to bridge the gap between Japanese and Korean history, Japan will 
address the issues and remedy what they have done wrong in the past.  By 
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III. CAN CHINA REGAIN THEIR “LITTLE BROTHER” 
RELATIONSHIP WITH A REUNIFIED KOREA? 
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
China has shared a long standing relationship with Korea since ancient 
history.  As early as the fifth century, the combination of geography, culture, and 
history have all positioned Chosun (Korea) as a loyal “little brother” in China’s 
tributary system.  Their aliance became fully institutionalized during the Yi 
Dynasty (1392-1910).69  Korea’s early history showed a divided peninsula in 
three separate kingdoms:  Shilla, Koguryo, and Paekche.  In 668 with the political 
and military alliance of China’s Tang dynasty, the Chosun peninsula was unified 
into a single country.70  With China’s assistance Korea would remain united until 
1905 except for occasional and brief periods of political division.  Many years 
after Tang the Chosun people would maintain their vassal relationship to Ming 
China, however, they would relate to other nations on an equal footing.  Even 
when the Manchus conquered northern China and establish the Qing Dynasty, 
the people of Chosun reluctantly maintained their vassal relationship. 71  Except 
for relations with China, the Chosun land under the Yi Dynasty sealed 
themselves off from the rest of the world and became known as “the Hermit 
Kingdom”.  Any foreigners that ventured onto the peninsula were expelled so any 
influence other than Chinese was non-existent.   
In the late 19th century, tensions rose between Japan and China as Korea 
was placed in the center of their conflict.  Many years of conflict over the Korean 
peninsula would bring competition between Russia, Japan and China.  The 
Treaty of Inchon, an agreement between Russia and Japan, weakened China’s 
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claims of suzerainty and strengthened Japan’s position on the peninsula.72  The 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 brought Japan across the Sea once again to 
the Korean peninsula.   Japan solidified its position of influence over China with 
its defeat and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  After this treaty tributary 
relations between China and Korea came to an end.  Furthermore, China lost all 
direct influence over Korea when Japan formally claimed Korea as their colony in 
1910.73  Through Japan’s occupation, Korea was shut off from China and the 
rest of the world.  Any foreign relations that China would have with Korea did not 
occur until the DPRK was formally established in the North under Russian 
influence.  Yet because of American influence, China would neither have 
relations nor influence with South Korea until the Cold War had ended. 
B. HISTORY AFTER KOREA’S DIVISION  
While the Soviet Union might have been responsible at the onset of the 
Cold War for the birth of the DPRK, it was China and its involvement in the 
Korean War which allowed it to survive.  The combination of historical 
connections and national interest has bonded China with Korea.  China was 
especially connected to the DPRK because of a shared security alliance.  Based 
on a fear of the United States and Japan promoting democracy over 
communism, the DPRK and China would become comrades.  A famous quote by 
Chinese government official Chou En-lai, spelled out the “lips and teeth” 
relationship between China and North Korea.  “Common struggles have bound 
our peoples in a profound militant friendship… our friendship is cemented with 
blood; it has been long tested and will stand up to future tests… The Chinese 
people will forever stand by the fraternal Korean people in their struggle to 
defend the security of their homeland.”74  The friendship was forged throughout 
history but cemented by Chinese remembrance of the assistance North Koreans 
provided in the Peoples Republic of China's (PRC’s) victory over the Nationalists 
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during China's civil war.  North Korea in turn also recognizes the support China 
offered the DPRK during the Korean War.75  China reentered the Korean 
peninsula after years of Japanese occupation and five years of U.S/Soviet 
influence in October 1950 when they crossed the Yalu River and confronted the 
American forces.  Three years later as the confrontation ended in a stalemate, 
China had suffered from 366,000 casualties.76  Koreans have remembered 
China’s actions as they came to the aid of the DPRK when in need even though 
they were not formally allied.  This alliance would be signed later.  On July 11, 
1961 Pyongyang signed a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance” with the PRC which repeated their declaration of support for security 
and economic allegiance to one another.77   
Following the Korean War and the division of the peninsula, the South 
Korean economy and infrastructure were being built up by Western investments 
and U.S.-Japanese aid packages; North Korea could only rely on assistance 
from Beijing and Moscow.  In a time when the North needed to rebuild itself, the 
Sino-Soviet split made things more difficult for North Korea to gain stature in the 
world.  The northern peninsula formed into blocks of competition between China 
and the USSR as they each sought North Korea’s allegiance.78  North Korea 
which counted on security and aid from both nations played them off against one 
another in order to gain maximum economic advantages.  North Korea showed 
their support for China and the Soviets while never formally aligning against 
either one of them.  They needed to hold on to Soviet aid since Beijing was only 
able to provide half the amount of aid that Moscow could. If the DPRK was to 
formally align with China, they would have lost heavy amounts of Soviet 
investments and aid.  Two major international crises in October 1962, the Sino-
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Indian border clash and the Cuban missile crisis, proved that the “lips and teeth” 
relationship with China was stronger than the desire for Soviet aid.79  The North 
Koreans responded angrily to Soviet actions that withheld support to the Chinese 
in the Sino-Indian border clash, and gave in to the United States during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  North Korea’s actions, along with a Sino-North Korean 
alliance, led to a final Soviet withdrawal of assistance and the isolation of North 
Korea from the Communist bloc.80  China and North Korea would remain close 
allies despite varying relations from year to year. 
During the 1950’s, China felt threatened by the encroaching Western 
powers along its borders.  Their perception of Western imperialism led to 
substantial military support for the North Koreans against the American and 
South Korean forces.  Despite China’s alliance with Pyongyang, they failed to 
support a North Korean military attack on South Korea.  Chinese forces were 
pulled out of the peninsula in 1958 and a policy for a stable Korean peninsula 
unifying under peaceful terms was adopted.81  Their change in ideology from 
when they supported the North Korean forces has been the product of a 
decreased personal attachment with DPRK leaders in the Chinese leadership.  
Deng Xiaoping and his party leaders had previously forged a supportive 
relationship with Kim Il Sung, extending sympathy to the North Korean people.  
Under the older leaders, North Korea represented comrades in arms that needed 
their assistance.82  Chinese foreign policy now has become more “businesslike” 
as Beijing is more and more frustrated at their attempts to modernize North 
Korea.  In the period from 1990-1997, North Korea’s economy showed negative 
growth, while drought and scorching heat led to widespread famine.  Many 
Chinese have regarded North Korea as China of yesterday when they were 
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going through the Cultural Revolution. 83  Chinese public opinion toward South 
Korea, however, began to be much more favorable. 
Beginning in the 1980s, it was clear to Beijing that developing relations 
with South Korea would increase China’s leverage on the peninsula and in East 
Asia.  China’s leverage would be increased by tapping into South Korea’s 
modernization programs.  Modernization through economic development could 
not be realized without South Korea supplying advanced technology, capital, 
markets, and managerial skills.84  Also, Chinese interest in maintaining a 
peaceful peninsula meant that they had to be balanced toward the two Koreas 
and not just one of the two.  Even though North Korea was not happy with 
China’s changing attitude toward South Korea, China had still maintained a 
degree of influence over Pyongyang.  In late 1990, Beijing was influential in 
reversing Pyongyang’s ‘One Korea’ policy by stating that they would no longer 
veto South Korea’s application to join the United Nations.85  China’s first step 
was to enhance bilateral relations by setting up trade offices in Seoul and Beijing 
by October 1990.  The offices quickly opened up the following year which led to 
normalization of relations between the two countries in 1992.86  In the South, 
both China and the ROK trust in one other and maintain close relations that are 
mutually beneficial.  Their relationship will bring more business opportunities to 
each of their countries and make them more competitive.87  Since the 
normalization of ties with both Koreas, China has played a significant role as 
balancer for both countries.  In June 1999, Chinese and North Korean leadership 
met for high-level talks.  Only a month later, the South Korean defense minister 
visited Beijing indicating that the ROK wanted China to play a “bridging role” 
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between North and South Korea.88  China has placed a significant emphasis on 
their influence over the peninsula in order to contain the U.S-Japanese alliance.  
To counterbalance a perceived hostile threat by these two powers, China desires 
to have greater leverage over Pyongyang as well as Seoul.  
China understands that the North has opened up their economy a little 
more towards South Korean and Japanese interests and investments; however, 
China is still the main source of aid and investments in the country.  In a letter to 
Kim Jong Il, Jiang Zemin restated his position that “the North and South should 
achieve independent and peaceful reunification through dialogues and 
negotiations, and will, as always, continue to work actively for the maintenance of 
peace and stability on the Peninsula.”89  Despite all the rhetoric from the Chinese 
leadership and governmental press, the Chinese officials are in a wait and see 
attitude toward the reunification of the Korean peninsula.  While they 
acknowledge that the Koreans should proceed with plans for reunification, they 
know that the actual unification will be a long way off.90  Until then the DPRK 
must find a way to enhance its economy and link it to trading with the outside 
world.  The dismantling of nuclear weapons in Yongbyon has been made a 
foreign policy priority.  The United States has helped by placing China in a 
powerful position to negotiate the dismantling of the nuclear program in the 
North, a position that might aid China in obtaining more influence over a reunified 
Korea.  Until these major goals have been obtained, China is in no way 
threatened by the reunified Korea.  They will only maintain their foreign policy of 
outward support while also continuing to wait and see what new power balances 
will be brought to their borders.  Nonetheless China pays close attention to the 
various ways Korean unification may be achieved.  These scenarios and their 
implications for China follow. 
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C. REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR 
1. Chinese Reaction to Aggression 
China would have to react to any aggression occurring on the Korean 
peninsula primarily because of the threat to their border security. China would no 
longer support North Korea if they were to militarily attack South Korea.  The 
Chinese want to see a peaceful and harmonious peninsula reunify under these 
conditions.   China has a strong trade relationship with South Korea and would 
not want to jeopardize their trade because of Northern aggression.  South Korea 
is able to provide China with valuable experience in Chinese industrialization, 
something that would be jeopardized if the DPRK were to attack the South.91  
While American forces would quickly repel the North Korean forces back to 
across the DMZ, with possible UN sanctions, the American forces may cross into 
North Korean territory and along the Chinese border.  This action by the 
American forces would threaten the careful balance of power in Northeast Asia. 
On a different note, the DPRK could be threatened by American forces.  
An aggressive behavior by the American administration could be a way to deter 
North Korea, a member of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” triad, from using their 
nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan.  The Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that was signed between China and North 
Korea is gray on the issue of whether China would enter into another war to 
defend the North Koreans.92  However China might react with their forces, they 
would most assuredly support the North Korean government through military and 
economic funds.  The threat of an American military action that was not 
sanctioned by the international community might bring Chinese forces along the 
North Korean border to defend their homeland. 
2.   Options for China 
In order for China to place the balance of power back in check so that 
neither North Korea nor the United States would find it advantageous to take 
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action against each other, they should have four strategies for their foreign 
policy.  The first of these strategies is to establish a neighboring power alliance 
with Russia.  If China and Russia were to cooperate in political, economic, and 
security matters, then they would have more influence together over the Korean 
region.  Security matters were established between the two nations by the 
recently established Shanghai Security Cooperative.  A second strategy will be to 
maintain its interest over Pyongyang so that China will have greater political and 
strategic leverage over the Korean peninsula.  The third strategy is for China to 
improve its relationship with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries.  Lastly, China will need to increase its community-building efforts in 
East Asia.93  Through all of these strategies, China will maintain the balance of 
power or even pull it in their direction.  If this were to happen, then both North 
Korea and the United States would not upset the balance by uniting the Korean 
peninsula under aggressive behavior.   
3.   Effects on China 
Beijing has avoided putting pressure on North Korea for nuclear 
disarmament economic sanctions.  They fear that Pyongyang would answer with 
an aggressive and warlike move.94  North Korea has been vocal about perceiving 
any economic sanctions as an aggressive move against their country.  If taken to 
extremes, China believes the DPRK would not want to back down and might be 
drawn into a war.  In the case of a war on the peninsula, there would be large-
scale destruction of infrastructure in the South and more than likely the North 
would be devastated by the American and South Korean military arsenal.  
Potential chemical weapons may be used against the South or along the Chinese 
border.  It is not of sound strategy for the North Koreans to use their 
inconsequential military technology against the Chinese who have been their 
friend throughout the DPRK’s history; however China could still possibly be 
affected and would need to plan accordingly.   
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China would ultimately need to worry about the flow of refugees into the 
northern territories of China.  These refugees would drain the Chinese system 
and economy as well as possibly pursue territorial claims inside Manchuria once 
the Korean peninsula has been reunited and established as a viable nation-state 
and economy.95  China does not want part of their industrial heartland in the 
northeast to fall into Korean hands, whether it is under unification policies or not.  
In March 2004, the Chinese Foreign Minister gave a press conference in which 
the question of North Korean refugees was raised.  He explicitly stated that the 
North Koreans that are crossing into China are only illegal border crossers and 
not refugees.  He stated, “It is noteworthy that a small number of people who are 
trying to politicize this issue and confuse the two concepts of illegal border 
crossers and so-called refugees.  They even use the pretext of human rights 
concerns and encourage those illegal border crossers to create political 
incidents, for example, to force their ways into the foreign diplomatic or consular 
missions in China, which is not acceptable”.96  He stated that the issue of “illegal 
border crossers” is being handled in accordance with domestic law, international 
law, and humanitarian principles.  It is obvious that with the close and continued 
friendship between China and North Korea, they would not accept the idea of 
refugees coming out of the North.  However, regardless of what they call the 
North Koreans as they come over the border, it is a problem that the Chinese will 
have to deal with on a large scale if they see political or economic upheaval in 
the North prior to a reunification. 
Lastly, an occupation of the North by the ROK or U.S. administrations 
would hold influence and command over the new united peninsula.97  This action 
could prove horribly detrimental to the Chinese.  American forces are already 
forward deployed on the peninsula and ready to take control of northern Korea if 
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needed.  Despite the friendly relations that China has had these past years with 
the United States, they do not want to see an American military presence in a 
unified Korea along the Chinese-Korean border.  Some ROK analysts have even 
gone so far as to say that China could militarily intervene in this situation if they 
foresaw that American military presence would continue beyond Korean 
reunification.98  An American military presence would not only mean more 
influence in the outcome of the Korean unification but the entire Northeast Asian 
region.   
D.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE DPRK’S COLLAPSE 
1. Options for China 
Chinese analysts believe that North Korea is currently stable, but can see 
threats that could potentially threaten the Kim leadership.  According to senior 
Chinese military experts, “If Kim Jong-il pursues a rigid policy, the reformers 
could oppose him.  It is also possible if Kim pursues reform he may be opposed 
by conservatives and be overthrown by them.”  In either case the experts believe 
that a power transition will be “accompanied by serious political turmoil and 
crisis.”99  Following the collapse of the North Korean government, China would 
be expected to be the first to offer military and economic assistance to South 
Korea to stabilize the North.  They need to exploit opportunities to be the 
dominant influence along the peninsula rather than sitting back and letting the 
United States take control.  One way for the Chinese to gain influence is by 
establishing political control over the northern region of the peninsula.  It has 
been surmised that China has taken North Korean defectors and “reeducated” 
them to the Chinese system.  If this is true, China would do well to send these 
North Koreans back into their homeland and put them into the governmental 
organizations.100   By doing this, the Chinese will have loyal supporters in 
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powerful governmental positions.  Another option for the Chinese is to establish 
dominance over the Tumen River Area Project.  This program will benefit both 
the fallen North Korean economy as well as China’s own economic strength.101  
Some of the main objectives of the Tumen River project are to attain greater 
growth and development for the people of the Tumen region and strengthen 
economic cooperation.102  To China this will mean that imports and exports of 
their goods will have North Korean ports to use.  While it will develop China’s 
economy, it will successfully build up the Tumen region as well. 
China’s main goal is to successfully use their historical ties with the 
Korean people to establish a strong influence over the region while downplaying 
the United States and Japanese presence.  To establish this dominant position, 
China will also need to divert investments and financial aid to the ROK so that 
they would not severely suffer from assuming the financial burdens of the North.  
Military personnel could be sent along the border region with Korea to prevent 
the flow of refugees into China and aid them with famine and medical issues.  
While using the military to show support for the Korean people, it would also put 
a military presence along North Korea’s border preventing American forces from 
establishing their own stronghold over Pyongyang.  China should take great heed 
in sending their forces over the border into North Korea, since it could be seen as 
an offensive action by the ROK and American military.  By establishing the 
military along the North Korean border and into Manchuria, China will have 
curbed the American military from establishing themselves in the northern half of 
the peninsula and threatening Chinese security.  Following the DPRK collapse, 
China will continue to strengthen its position over the peninsula with military and 
economic persuasion while drawing on its historical relations.  
2.   Effects on China 
Despite their close friendship, China views the DPRK government as one 
of the most unpredictable governments in the world.  While they had a close 
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relationship with the late Kim Il-Sung, they have little confidence in the current 
leadership by Kim Jong-il, the son of Kim Il-Sung.  China knows that the collapse 
of Kim Jong-il’s government would have many worrisome repercussions.  
According to one analyst, “The Chinese leadership fears a North Korean collapse 
not because it wants to avoid the loss of another communist state, but because 
of the possible deleterious impact on China.”103  Some of the dangers to China 
would be the large flow of refugees, civil war in the North, and a possible North-
South conflict that could spill into northeastern China.  Concern over these 
factors might lead China to take action before they have to deal with the 
aftereffects.  According to a senior Chinese military researcher, “China would not 
watch North Korea experience difficulties with both our hands in our pockets.”104 
The most prevalent belief from Korea scholars is that North Korea would 
collapse as a result of their economy.  China has tried to develop the North’s 
economy so that it could eventually support itself.  They have had trouble 
incorporating the Chinese based economy model because of the DPRK 
leaderships’ fears that success will threaten the regime and the North Korean 
Worker’s Party that supports them.105  Without an economic revival in the North, 
China fears that an economic collapse would bring devastating economic 
hardships to South Korea as well.  Currently, South Korea ranks as one of 
China’s top trading partners and sources for investment.  In the event of an 
economic collapse, South Korean investment would have to be diverted to North 
Korea and away from China.  This investment has made a dramatic impact on 
the Chinese economy as South Korean investments have risen from $260 million 
in 1992 to over $1.67 billion in 1994 and continue to rise.106  But China not only 
fears the outcome from an economic collapse, but a political one as well.  China 
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as well as the world is not sure what the DPRK leaders would do when faced 
with the challenge of an economic collapse. 
China, on the other hand, has been affiliated with both the North and the 
South Korean economies as they have relationships on both sides of the border.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has been the DPRK’s largest 
trading partner.  By bypassing the United Nations and giving aid directly to 
Pyongyang, they are able to use their assistance as leverage to pursue their own 
political purposes and goals.107  An economic collapse of North Korea would 
cause China to redirect more funds to the Korean peninsula than they are 
currently sending to the North.  They would also have to worry about the massive 
flow of refugees across their borders and along one of China’s industrial hubs.  A 
follow on interest after a few years of reunification on the peninsula might be for 
the Korean nation to reclaim the territory that is now one of the Chinese industrial 
centers.  If a heavy flow of Korean refugees were to inhabit that area, Korea 
would have more of a claim to that soil since Koreans already inhabit the area.  
Lastly, a further concern of the Chinese would be that with an economic collapse 
in the North, it would bring a heavy Japanese and United States influence right 
along their border once Korea unifies.  While relations have been improving over 
the past years with the United States, China still does not want their citizens to 
see how much better they could prosper under a democratic Korean society. 
E.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF INTER-KOREAN OR 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
1. Options for China 
Out of the three reunification scenarios, inter-Korean or multilateral 
diplomacy is the only one that asks the Koreas to make the process gradual so 
that all powers involved will have time to adapt to the new nation.  China would 
benefit from this gradual process.  A rapid reunification under terms of 
aggression or a collapse could bring the American military closer to the border 
than the Chinese would like.  Reunification under the terms of multilateral 
diplomacy asks all powers to put their concerns on the table and work them out.  
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China’s main concerns will be Sino-American relations and the American 
presence on the Korean border.  While China realizes that an American military 
presence stabilizes any situation that might arise with Japan, they do not want 
American presence on the peninsula once the peninsula is reunified.108   
China’s main tool for imposing their reunification ideals upon the two 
Koreas will be the Beijing Six Power Talks.  At the insistence of Washington, 
U.S.-DPRK nuclear talks have been expanded to include multilateralism in hopes 
of applying the maximum amount of pressure on Korean leaders.  Because of 
their political as well as economic ties to North Korea, China maintains a 
powerful and influential position in the nuclear dialogues.  Talks in August 2003, 
February 2004, and July 2005 were held in Beijing.  Based on their powerful 
influence, the United States has unsuccessfully tried to apply pressure to sway 
Chinese opinions.  China has maintained throughout the talks that economic 
sanctions were not to be used on the North Korean state.  China was deliberate 
in maintaining their normal trade with their friend and neighbor when they were 
asked to reduce their food and oil shipments to North Korea.109  China, like most 
of the other six party participants, has always opposed any use of force and held 
fast to engaging North Korea on diplomatic terms.  They have opposed any 
action to take the issue to the United Nations because they do not want to see a 
communist regime collapse.  Along those same lines, they do not want the 
American military so close to their borders in a war that would send North Korean 
refugees into their country.110  In a statement made by China’s delegate to the 
talks, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on August 26, 2003 “the Korean Peninsula 
should be nuclear-free.  At the same time, [North Korea’s] security concerns 
should also be addressed through … dialogue and peaceful talks.”111  
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An option for China to impose on the reunified Koreas would be the “China 
Model” economy.  It is called this because of the economic development zones 
that are in southeastern China.  It is feasible in the North because they have 
already established one of the same economic zones, the RajinSonbong Free 
Economic and Trade Zone, in the northernmost part of the country.112  This 
would be a South Korean led conglomerate since most of the investors would be 
South Korean corporations.  This model would raise the standard of living and 
industrial productivity gradually throughout the North.  The North Korean 
leadership would be in favor of it as well since the zones would expand 
selectively and under government management.113  This situation would be ideal 
for the DPRK to maintain their political leadership while avoiding a reunification 
by default.  It would also be ideal for China since the introduction of foreign 
investments into North Korea with its subsequent rise in standard of living would 
mean less dependence on China.  More importantly, by sustaining their 
leadership in North Korea, China will benefit from the absence of American 
presence and influence along their borders.   
2.   Effects on China 
Chinese policy toward involvement in the Korean reunification dialogue 
has done an about face from past decades.  Previously, China believed that 
nations had the right to develop any self-defense weapons that they choose.  By 
involving outside powers in Korea’s reunification proceedings China worried that 
a precedent would be set with regards to involving outside powers.  If Japan, 
Russia, and the United States are used to involving themselves in unification 
issues, China will have more problems than they would like when it comes time 
to reunify with the island of Taiwan.  However, China sees North Korea and other 
nations surrounding them as a security matter and inaction might be more 
destabilizing than the precedent that might be set.114  In a recent magazine 
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called Oriental Outlook, China is described as “now surrounded by nuclear 
states”, including “Russia, India, and Pakistan.  Taiwan has long held blueprints 
for nuclear weapons, and should North Korea collapse and unify, there would be 
a substantially stronger regional rival right on China’s border”.115  It is not only 
the government regimes that worry China.  China is now worried about nuclear 
terrorism and the likes of Al-Qaeda showing up in the far west Xinjiang region.116  
According to an official at the Communist Central Party School in Beijing, 
“Nonproliferation is the goal, especially for the new generation of leaders like Hu 
Jintao.  For China to try and create this image is a necessity.  Nonproliferation is 
something not avoidable for China in this time.”117  Their strategy has drastically 
changed to provide for the security of their nation and people.  China has shown 
a willingness to work with the United States and other officials for the goal of 
nonproliferation and will continue to hash out a gradual reunification on the 
Korean peninsula.  Their weight just might prove to be the determining factor in 
hashing out an agreement in the Beijing talks which will continue toward systems 
and models for the reunification process. 
F. NATIONAL OPTIONS FOR CHINA 
1.   Chinese Factors to Shape a Future Korea 
An important factor for China to consider in shaping the future Korea is to 
maintain equal relations with both Koreas.  China has the difficult position of 
maintaining their close relationship with the North and their new relations with the 
South while avoiding favoring one over the other.  Since the end of the Sino-
Soviet split, the North Koreans are no longer needed to provide the support to 
China that it once needed during the Cold War.  China has been able to enhance 
their relationship with South Korea and not split from North Korea.  A growing 
economic relationship with South Korea has been developed through the years 
making friendly alliances a possibility even if it is just based on trade and 
investments.  Trade with South Korea alone has reached $30 billion and the PRC 
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has become their largest trade partner.118    Both Beijing and South Korea prefer 
a reunification to take place gradually and throughout a period of time in which 
North Korea can be kept afloat with outside investments.  The Chinese 
government has been instrumental in keeping the North Korean economy from 
escaping a collapse by providing massive amounts of aid which total almost one-
third of the entire Chinese developmental assistance.119  South Korea has 
supported this aid through the Sunshine Policy as well as aid of its own.  If China 
is to continue their success, they must have the trade relationship with South 
Korea and divert some money into North Korea.  China will need to maintain their 
relations with both Koreas in order to have influence once reunification comes 
around. 
A second factor for China’s consideration is their reunification with Taiwan.  
China has been very cautious in becoming overly involved with reunification 
issues stating that they believe that it is a matter to be worked out peacefully on 
their own.  Because of the “North Korean factor” as well as the “one China policy” 
in which they face their own dilemmas of a reunification, it makes influence over 
the Korean peninsula a sticky situation.120  China has only recently, with the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, been in the forefront coaxing the 
DPRK back to the Six Party Talks.  China fears as much as the other neighboring 
nations of Asia what a reunified Korea would do to them.  However, their 
influence in the denuclearization of the peninsula echoes their desires to have 
Korea reunified peacefully and independently.  Their hopes are that a reunified 
Korea is strong enough to deter the rise of Japanese power, yet weak enough 
economically not to take away Chinese competition. 
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Another security factor that remains through reunification would be the 
issue of refugees moving into the industrial sector of China that borders the 
North.  Recent remarks from the PRC delineate that there is no refugee problem, 
however they know that any unification that is more rapid than is needed to 
develop the North Korean economy would bring thousands of North Koreans 
their way.  This would cost the Chinese government money and time that will 
prove difficult to deal with especially since reports of malnutrition and numerous 
illnesses plague the North Korean people.  Refugees might pose a greater 
problem to China since there are already multitudes of Chinese with Korean 
ethnicity in the Northeastern sector of China.  Historically, this land did belong to 
the “Chosun” people when the peninsula was unified.  Under a reunification, 
China would fear Korean nationalism claiming that land which has become a 
valuable industrial sector to China.  The DPRK has already made the statement 
that they “want to have all the areas in [China’s] Northeast where Kim Il-Sung 
fought as a guerrilla commander against the Japanese during World War II”.121  
The flow of refugees into this land would only strengthen the cause as more 
Koreans would inhabit the area. 
The last and main factor that would shape a Chinese policy toward Korean 
reunification is relations with the United States.  While Chinese and American 
relations have been improving, both nations feel that they are in competition with 
one another regionally and globally.  If North Korea were to collapse or be 
swallowed up by the South, Beijing would no longer have the security buffer in a 
highly militarized region that it once had.122  China fears that an American 
military presence would stare at them across the Yalu River once North Korea is 
swallowed up by the South and create a security threat that would cause them in 
turn to build up their forces along the Chinese-Korean border. 
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2.   Best Case Scenario 
China’s key national security objective on the Korean peninsula is to have 
a friendly and stable Korea on its borders.  A reunified Korea should be receptive 
to Chinese influence and not Japanese military or economic power.123  China 
believes that they can best serve the reunification process on the peninsula if 
their reunification with Taiwan has taken place first.124  Therefore, under a 
gradual reunification of the Korean peninsula, China will have first reunified with 
Taiwan. The first step to this peaceful peninsula is to denuclearize the peninsula 
through the Six-Party Talks.  North Korea’s presence in the region with nuclear 
weapons not only threatens China, but Japan as well.  As long as Japan feels 
threatened there is the greater possibility that they will initiate their own nuclear 
program in defense.  This action by the Japanese would in turn threaten China 
again.  It would be a snowball effect which would be first solved by eliminating 
the North Korean threat.  Under this scenario, the North and South would have 
reunified under a very gradual process in which the North has taken on the 
“China model” for the economy.  Using this model, China would obviously have 
more influence over the developing North Korean economy and the burden of 
raising their economy would be taken on by all nations involved.  The next step 
prior to reunification would be to minimize the American influence with South 
Korea.  In order to do this, a peace treaty to terminate the Korean War should be 
negotiated between the North and South to go along with their nonaggression 
agreement.  This pact should also include the declaration of a neutral and 
nonaligned policy in the region.  Based on this there would be the reduction of 
conventional arms by the two Koreas, the disbanding of the United Nations 
command, and the withdrawal of all American forces from the peninsula.125  The 
reduction of arms on the peninsula will not only ease tension along the peninsula, 
but also the Asian-Pacific region.  This scenario would provide the maximum 
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benefits to the Chinese as they maintain influence, end the nuclear threat, and 
minimize American influence along the Korean peninsula. 
3.   Worst Case Scenario 
China knows that the North and the South do not threaten them 
individually while they are a divided nation.  They do believe that they could be 
threatened once Korea is reunified.  It is estimated that the new Korea could 
become a “regional power with world-influence”.126  What they can do with that 
new power depends on what major nation will have the influence over the 
peninsula and whether it will be able to threaten China once they are sharing a 
border.  In the case of a rapid reunification in which the North has collapsed or 
aggression by the North has taken place, American military power would be 
directly involved on the peninsula.  The threat of the United States-Japan power 
having more influence and directly neighboring them makes the Chinese 
discourage Korean reunification.  They are not able to state this outwardly based 
on relations with both the DPRK and the ROK; however, a reunification of the 
Korean peninsula does nothing but threaten the Chinese influence and security 
in the region if it were to share the American relations that South Korea has 
currently.  China would rather have many smaller neighbors than have a border 
region that is a single large neighbor.127  A South Korean domination over the 
North would have close ties to the West and possible U.S. forces sharing the 
border into China.  Also, the North would have to go through economic reform 
which would be aided by the Japanese to promote stability in the region.128  The 
China model would not be used and possible American military action on the 
peninsula might even damage China’s own economic stability.129  Japan and the 
United States would establish political and economic influence throughout the 
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reunified peninsula.  Seoul would no longer depend on China to maintain North 
Korean peace and security over the region and their influence would dwindle.  
Western and Japanese influence would remain more powerful and possibly might 
be able to get the new Korean nation to join in the anti-China coalition.130  In the 
end, rapid reunification of the Korean peninsula would only bring on more 
security concerns with the Western influence and a loss of Chinese influence.  
4.   Policy Approaches 
The Chinese government has shared with the rest of the major powers in 
outwardly supporting the Korean people in their reunification goal through 
peaceful measures.  It is difficult for policy to be made since Korean reunification 
is currently unfeasible to Chinese national interests.  Yet, because of their 
interest to reunify with Taiwan and their support for the DPRK, Beijing must 
continue to support the reunification goals of the two Koreas.  China fears that 
American presence on the peninsula will continue as they increase their 
influence over a reunified Korea.  In order for China to have more of a say in the 
reunification process, it must first continue to hold the multilateral Six Party Talks 
in Beijing.   
China also must continue to persuade the North Korean government to 
commit to dialogue in ending the nuclear problem and promoting stability in the 
region.  Since China is North Korea’s closest ally, they will prove to have 
impeccable worth among the other nations as they act as an intermediary 
between Pyongyang and Washington.131  In the event that Korea is reunified via 
a rapid process such as North Korean collapse, China must first try to work with 
Russia, Japan, and the United States to not unilaterally interfere with the inter-
Korean situation.   The solution would need to come out of a multilateral 
committee that will be comprised of all of the powers.  The Six-Party Talks that 
have been created for the denuclearization will form the base of this committee.  
In the likely event of a gradual reunification, China should strive for a settlement 
that would include: the Korean peninsula as a nuclear free zone; a ban on 
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military nuclear capabilities; a peace treaty; strengthening the nonaggression 
agreement between the North and South; phased conventional arms reduction; 
disbanding of the UN Command; and withdrawal of American forces.132  Second, 
China should strive to play an active role in promoting regional economic 
cooperation.  An example of this might include the Tumen River Project and the 
promotion of multilateral cooperation through dialogue.  Lastly, China will try to 
establish multilateral agreements in the region vice the bilateral treaties that have 
been in place for so long.  This will go a long way toward incorporating all nations 
in dialogue and mutual security.  With multilateral treaties, third powers could no 
longer hold power over other nations such as Korea and Japan.  They would 
share an alliance rather than going through the United States.  Through 
negotiations and involvement between all of the powers involved, a unified Korea 
will evolve that is beneficial to China’s political and strategic position within the 
region. 
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IV. CAN RUSSIA GAIN THE POWER OF COERCION? 
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
In 2005, the question of whether North Korea has nuclear weapons 
capabilities looms large over the minds of many leaders in Asia and the rest of 
the world.  While the North Koreans are quick to admit that they do have nuclear 
weapons which they would use against an enemy in their national defense, 
neighbors such as Russia are still skeptical.  If they were to possess such 
potential, then the four major powers active in the area, Japan, Russia, China, 
and the United States, must work with South Korea to dissolve these nuclear 
weapons.  The ability of the North to continue a nuclear program worries all that 
are involved, regardless of whether they too own nuclear weapons.  Until this 
nuclear dilemma has been solved, major powers involved in the Beijing talks will 
drag their feet on other Korean reunification issues.  Russia, which just became a 
part of the Beijing based Six-Party Talks for Korean disarmament in August 
2003, has been trying to use its long standing relationship with the Korean 
peninsula to sway North Korea to dissolve its nuclear program, and thus gain 
more influence in the Korean reunification process.   
Russian involvement with the Korean people goes back to the nineteenth 
century when they were trying to bind Russia’s newly acquired territory in the Far 
East.  Tsarist Russia seized territories of East Siberia and the Far East. Through 
the Aigun Treaty of 1858 Russia also took the territory north of the Amur and 
Ussari Rivers from China.  In 1860 they also took China’s Maritime Province 
which was in Northeastern China along the border of Korea.133  It was after all of 
these acquisitions that Russia for the first time would share a border with Korea.  
In 1880, the Russian population in the Far East was less than 100,000 and far 
outnumbered by the neighboring Chinese, Koreans, and Tungus, who were a 
Siberian ethnic group living in the area between the Yenisei and Ob river basins 
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to the Pacific Ocean.134  To have Russian control of this new territory, Russia 
established de facto control over Manchuria.  In turn, for this action, Russia 
needed to have a dominant position in Korea.135  Thus, Russia first became 
involved in Korea so that foreign lands would not threaten the security of 
Manchuria and the Far East territories of Russia.  From 1895-1904, Russia’s 
main political aim was geo-strategic in Korea - trying to deny Japan the military 
advantage while also gaining the warm-water ports on the peninsula.  When 
Japan called on Russia to withdraw its Far Eastern armies, Russia refused and 
Japan declared war on them, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.  This would 
be the first modern war that would be fought over the Korean peninsula.  Japan 
was victorious and gained the dominant position in Korea.  Russia made 
attempts to move southward into Korea again, but they were foiled by both 
Britain and Japan.  Therefore, it was on August 8, 1945, that the Soviet Union 
declared war on Japan, and on August 12th, the first Soviet troops arrived in 
Korea.  Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15th.  The Soviet troops 
were already operating in the northern part of Korea while American forces were 
more than 1,000 miles away from landing in South Korea.136  Washington 
believed that the Russian occupation of the North might mean the takeover of the 
entire peninsula.  Fearing the creation of another communist nation in Asia, on 
August 15th the United States proposed to divide Korea along the 38th parallel.  
Not wanting to cut the Americans out of Korea and consequently be cut out of 
Japan, the following day Stalin consented to Washington’s plan and divided 
Korea along the 38th parallel, thus creating what we know today as North and 
South Korea.  North Korea under the heavy influence of their communist 
government known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be a 
crucial part of the Soviet Union’s outer security territory.  North Korea would 
secure a buffer for them against potential United States, Japanese, and Chinese 
threats.  It was important during the Cold War for the Soviet Union to maintain 
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their heavy influence over North Korea as it meant their survival in the Northeast 
Asian region. 
B. KOREA’S DIVISION:  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
It can be stated that the Soviet Union was in essence the founder of the 
DPRK in the North.  The Soviet Union’s support of the North Korean state was 
essential in its survival.  After the creation of the two Korean states in 1948, it 
was the Soviet Union that recognized the DPRK as “the only legitimate 
representative” of the Korean people.137  Following World War II, it was the 
Soviet ideology that brought forward “The Great Leader”, Premier Kim Il-Sung, to 
lead the North Korean people under the socialist views of Mother Russia.  The 
Soviet Union considered Korea to be a “truly socialist state” and a “member of 
the world Socialist community and a bulwark against American imperialism and 
Japanese militarism.”138  Based on this relationship, the Soviet Union thought of 
North Korea as one of its foremost allies.  The DPRK in turn was closely allied for 
its survival to the Soviets.  There were hundreds of millions of Soviet dollars in 
the form of commodities and natural resources pumped into the Northern 
economy to keep it alive.139  Committed to one another, the Soviet Union and 
DPRK had a bilateral treaty called the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance” which was signed on July 6, 1961 and automatically renewed 
itself every five years.  This treaty agreed that the Soviet Union would intervene 
to aid the DPRK if they were attacked by another country.  As history continued 
forward, relations with the DPRK would slow down because of increased 
tensions between the Soviets and China, the DPRK’s other major ally.  Even 
though China and the Soviet Union were split, North Korea still maintained 
bilateral relations with each one.  The DPRK commonly tried to appease both of 
their allies with a neutral approach, however there were many times in which they 
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did not agree with Soviet actions if they chose national interests over communist 
ideology.  The dislocation of ideology between the Soviet Union and the DPRK 
was evident when Yugoslavia and Albania chose their own communist path apart 
from the Soviet leadership.  The DPRK blamed the Soviets for letting Yugoslavia 
and Albania go their own way.  Despite North Korea’s foreign policy of Sino-
Soviet neutralism, the North Koreans had problems with the Soviet Union.  In 
1962, bilateral relations between the two countries would be influenced by 
several incidents.  First, Khrushchev changed the rules and demanded payment 
in money rather than on credit or barter, for the weapons that were being 
supplied to the North Koreans.  The second incident took place in 1968 during 
the Pueblo crisis.  The Soviets made it clear that they would not support 
aggressive North Korean actions toward the United States no matter what the 
first article of the 1961 Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty stated.140   
The DPRK would constantly play the Russians and Chinese against one 
another in an attempt to gain as many concessions as possible.  This diplomatic 
game became obvious to the Russians when they decided in the late 1980s to 
abandon most relations with Pyongyang.  Prior to this the late Cold War Soviet 
and DPRK relationship could be divided into a three periods:  1980-82, 1983-89, 
and 1990 to August 1991.141  In the first period, both the North Koreans and the 
Russians tried to distance themselves from one another.  In North Korea, their 
media printed anti-Soviet articles which had been authored by Chinese leaders.  
However, both the Soviets and the North Koreans needed one another.  North 
Korea desperately needed help to modernize in comparison to the ROK while the 
Soviets faced the possibility of an anti-Soviet alliance emerging again in Asia.  
Both nations needed friends in the region and turned to one another. 142  In the 
second period, both countries were active in their exchanges both politically and 
economically.  An agreement was reached for the Soviet Union to build atomic 
power plants as long as North Korea joined the Non Proliferation Treaty 
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(NPT).143  For the third period, Mikhail Gorbachev had come into power and 
formulated a strategy of establishing relations with a growing South Korea.  This 
would be fully realized in September 1990 when Moscow normalized relations 
with Seoul.  Since the Soviets turned to the South, the North was forced to look 
somewhere other than the Soviet Union for their economic and military 
support.144  Since the normalization of relations with South Korea, Russo-North 
Korean relations took a three-stage path:  1991-1995, 1995-1999, and the 
current years under the Putin administration.145  In the first stage under the 
administration of Boris Yeltsin, the Russians were trying to distance themselves 
as much as they could from the North Korean communist allies.  The policy was 
to basically ignore the DPRK and turn their attention to the ROK.  It was 
recognized that China was growing more powerful in the region and could 
overtake the Russian influence as well as threaten demographic and economic 
security in the Russian Far East.146  From 1992-1995, Russian “Korean policy” 
would be more tilted toward the ROK while economic relations were cultivated.  
The first stage is epitomized by the nullification of the bilateral military treaty 
when Russia would sell arms to “any country in the world except North Korea”.147  
It was not until 1996 when Moscow began to pursue a balanced or equidistant 
“Two Koreas” policy between the DPRK and ROK.  In the second stage, Russia 
placed emphasis on bilateral relations with their traditional allies such as India, 
North Korea, and the Republics formerly under Soviet control.  Their policy was a 
balanced position between the two Koreas.  The third stage is a reflection of 
Russia’s desire for influence in the Asia-Pacific region.148 
                                            
143  Zhebin, "Russia and North Korea: An Emerging, Uneasy Partnership," 730.  
144  Ferguson, "Perspectives on the Future of the Korean Peninsula:  Russia's Role on the 
Korean Peninsula and Great Power Relations in Northeast Asia," 36.  
145  Seung Ham Yang, Woosang Kim, and Yongho Kim, "Russo-North Korean Relations in 
the 2000s," Asian Survey 44, no. 6 (2004): 796.  
146  Ferguson, "Perspectives on the Future of the Korean Peninsula:  Russia's Role on the 
Korean Peninsula and Great Power Relations in Northeast Asia," 37.  
147  Yang, Kim, and Kim, "Russo-North Korean Relations in the 2000s," 796.  
148  Yang, Kim, and Kim, "Russo-North Korean Relations in the 2000s," 797.  
56 
Since 2000, Moscow has made efforts to re-establish friendly relations 
with the DPRK while still maintaining their ties to the South.  The Soviet Union 
had made a major effort to industrialize the North Korean state prior to the end of 
the Cold War and into the late 1980s.  Even though they had temporarily 
abandoned relations with North Korea, Moscow currently has a “voice in Kim 
Jong-il’s ear”.  Their history has tied them to one another.  Their influence in the 
Six-Party Talks has only been since August 2003, when they were invited to join 
at the request of the North Koreans.  The Soviets plan on gaining more influence 
through the denuclearization in the North at the Six-Party Talks and then using it 
towards reunification efforts.  As it stands, Russia favors a gradual process 
toward Korean unification.  The two Koreas should “pursue a long-term peaceful 
coexistence before they achieve unification; South Korea or the United States 
should not attempt to change North Korea’s behavior or seek North Korea’s 
collapse; Korean unification should be achieved through peaceful means; and 
the two Koreas should negotiate for peaceful unification on an equal footing.”149  
Russia is willing to contribute to the reunification process in any way that it can, 
but most of the international community now only sees Russia’s future as a 
mediator and facilitator for peace and security with no real influence over the two 
Koreas.  This chapter will discuss how Russia can expand their influence over 
the peninsula and show their power to the rest of the international community. 
C. REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR 
1. Russia’s Reaction to Aggression 
Russians, just like the other major powers, support a gradual and peaceful 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula.  They do not want to see the Korean 
unification happen as a result of forceful means or another Korean War that 
would disrupt reforms that have been made in the Russian Far East and in North 
Korea.150  In 1961, the Soviet Union held a close mutual alliance treaty with the 
North Koreans which promised to come to their aid if they were attacked or to 
support them in their unification.  Russia no longer has this clause in their Treaty 
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of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation which was signed and went 
into effect in 2000.  Instead of the automatic military intervention clause which 
had been in the original treaty, it only contains a “mutual contact” clause which 
may be subject to numerous different Russian interpretations.151 
Russia views actions of North Korean aggression either against South 
Korea or Japan desiring reunification as an act of war and defiance against the 
international community.  In fact, many experts assert that the North Koreans 
have multiple scenarios which could lead the international community into the 
belief that the DPRK is at war with South Korea to reunify the peninsula.  One 
scenario would be a second DPRK invasion which was similar to the one in 1950 
when they came across the Demilitarized Zone to unite the Korean land.  This 
sort of attack by the North Koreans would not be supported at all by the Russian 
government as well as the rest of the international community. Russia would see 
this offensive action by the DPRK as a security threat to their Northeastern lands.  
By placing their own military forces along the North Korean border, it will stem 
the Chinese and American forces from spilling into Russian lands. 
Another scenario would include a North Korean nuclear missile landing 
within the South Korean or Japanese borders and taking out a large piece of 
infrastructure and society.  This would also be met with the same type of 
disapproval by Russia and the rest of the world.  If the North Koreans were to 
take part in small destabilizing campaigns rather than a highly criticized large 
scale war against the South, Russia would have to be very careful in their policy 
toward the North.  In the event that the DPRK took this action, the Russian 
military would be wary of supporting any movement into the northern part of the 
peninsula.  They would realistically watch the development and take a backseat 
regarding whatever action is taken first by the United States and Japan.  Russia, 
while maintaining a close personal relationship with Kim Jong-il, does not want to 
see a war on the peninsula as it would affect their Far East region with refugees 
and aid that would need to be pumped into the economy after the war’s 
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termination.  Russia has made it known to the DPRK in the first half of 2003 that 
if they were to cross the “red line” by going nuclear or attacking the South, it 
would force them to collaborate with the United States-led international 
sanctions.152  Russia will continue its mediation and supportive approach by not 
taking a forward active role if there were to be a war via North Korean 
aggression. 
While Russia has been active in denouncing North Korea for taking any 
action against the ROK, they have been equally in opposition to an American-led 
preemptive strike.  Moscow was one of the few Security Council members in the 
United Nations which was against the United States’ preemptive actions in Iraq.  
Russia would be equally against any actions taken against North Korea.  On a 
lesser scale, Russia has been active in never allowing a vote in the United 
Nations to come up for an economic embargo against North Korea.  Even though 
Russia and China would more than likely veto such an action and that is why the 
sanction has not been brought up in the UN Security Council, Russia fears that 
this could lead to a war and chaos.153  The only time that the Russian 
government has wavered with regard to imposing economic sanctions, is if the 
DPRK would continue with their nuclear program and not find a diplomatic 
conclusion.  If they agreed to back the economic sanctions, Russia added that 
North Korea’s security would need to be guaranteed.  Russia’s stance is directed 
at the United States’ policy of unilateral and preventive military action which is 
not supported in Moscow. 
2.   Options for Russia 
Russia has been decisive in its statements that they do not want to see an 
escalation of a conflict on the peninsula in order for it to reunify.  Moscow would 
be the first to veto any vote in the Security Council deciding a need to take out 
the North Korean nuclear program and regime rather than waiting for a nuclear 
strike by Pyongyang.  Russia has often criticized the Bush administration for their 
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hard-line stance toward the North Koreans and believes that their provocative 
rhetoric does nothing but worsen the situation and get on the nerves of the 
DPRK.154  Although they fear fallout from a North Korean nuclear attack, Russia 
has not supported the United States in their preemptive actions against Iraq and 
would be less willing to support them against the North Koreans even more since 
it is in their backyard.  Russian forces might be asked to participate in a United 
Nations attempt to repel the North Korean military.  If the DPRK takes drastic 
offensive action across the DMZ, there will be no use in maintaining close 
relations with Kim Jong-il.  Russia will use its military forces to support the United 
Nations led military force and in placement along their Siberian borders to control 
the flow of refugees.  Relations with Kim Jong-il will be cut, but the regime will not 
be around much longer anyway for it to matter to Russian policy.  It will be more 
beneficial for Russian influence in reunification matters if their military is involved 
with the United Nations’ action.  Politically, the Russian government will be as 
outspoken about any United States action that is taken outside of the United 
Nations as it was with Iraq.  In the event of a United States attack, the Russians 
would react with military neutrality and not come to the aid of the North Koreans 
like they did in 1950. 
3.   Effects on Russia 
A unification of this type would have some drastic characteristics for the 
Russian people.  For instance, in the event of a war there would be massive 
Korean and American casualties along the war torn peninsula.  However, there 
could be Russian civilians and infrastructure in the Far East corner of Russia 
which can be hit by North Korean missiles as well.  There would be large-scale 
infrastructure ruined in the South and more than likely the North would be 
completely devastated.  Potential chemical weapons may be used against the 
South as well as Russian borders.  Lastly, there would be an occupation of the 
North by the ROK or U.S. administrations which would hold influence and 
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command over the new united peninsula.155 This outcome would lead to the 
possibility of Russians coming under the direct fire of the North Koreans, while 
also dealing with the flow of refugees coming out of the North.  Russia’s 
economy is not as strong as other three major powers.  Monetary aid and 
support could take a direct role in rebuilding the infrastructure of the peninsula 
and therefore giving the dominant position in Korea to that power which has the 
most money to support a new government and reunited state.  This would have a 
great effect on Russia, along with the future occupation of troops from either 
China or the United States, following a war on the peninsula. 
In conclusion, Russia does not want to see Korean unification achieved by 
forceful means since a war on the peninsula would disrupt abilities to develop in 
their Far East.  They have a close relationship with the DPRK as well as the 
United States.  They will not hinder a United States action to save their friends in 
the North.  Militarily, the Russians will not be involved with another Korean War.  
They will, however, try to get involved with infrastructural projects once the 
fighting is done and a stable government has been put in place on the peninsula.  
While this is the most drastic of the three scenarios toward the path of 
reunification, Russia will not be overly burdened if this scenario were to be 
pursued. 
D.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE DPRK’S COLLAPSE 
1. Options for Russia 
Russia’s policy towards the two Koreas over the past decade has been to 
have a neutral and somewhat equal relationship with both of them.  In order to 
support a collapse of North Korea and then a follow on unification of the 
peninsula, it would be best for Russia’s influence over a unified Korea to maintain 
this close relationship with both of the governments in case there are any 
remnants of the DPRK still standing.  In the event that a new North Korean 
government has replaced the Kim regime, it will be important for Russia to step in 
and aid the new leadership in the international community.  Both China and the 
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United States will be vying for their alliance, however, Russia can act as a third 
party which is more neutral towards the two superpowers and receive North 
Korea’s trust.  Russia’s role as a third party depends on the presence of North 
Korean leadership rather than Chinese or American forces stepping in to fill a 
power vacuum.  It is believed that once the North collapses, all sides would 
scramble for advantage over the others.  Russia will not remain a silent neighbor 
while all of this occurs.156  This would of course only be one option that they 
could take. 
Even though Russia does not have the vast amount of funds that the other 
major powers have available, they should give aid and invest in the new Korean 
state once it has collapsed.  Russia will be able to link their railways to the 
Korean peninsula in their “iron silk road” project.157  This project will have an 
impact on a post-collapse Korean society which needs to be built up quickly.  The 
“iron silk road” will make the transportation of goods between Asia and Europe 
cheaper and faster and therefore reducing shipping costs.  With the reduction in 
costs, Russia and Europe will be able to increase their trade with Korea and 
modernize and invest in the peninsula along the way.  Russia’s support of 
Korea’s economy would diminish the role of Japan on the peninsula.  Russian 
security could be threatened by a unified Korea that is powerfully influenced by 
Japan.  A military arms race in Asia would also threaten the security of the 
Russian Far East border.  Besides Japanese influence, Russia does not want to 
see Chinese superiority as the predominant factor over the peninsula.  Russia 
would gain influence over a unified Korea as they support the new Korean state 
as a neutral and objective power which formerly had sway with the North as well 
as the South.   
2.   Effects on Russia 
Russia would suffer minimally from a North Korean governmental or 
economic collapse.  First and foremost, there would be massive numbers of 
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refugees crossing the border into the Russian Far East.  Domestic problems 
would result as Russia integrated masses of people who have little to no money, 
varying skills, and most likely problematic health issues including 
malnourishment.  In 2003, Russia conducted an enormous military exercise in 
the Far East in which its main feature was to accept up to 100,000 North Korean 
refugees who might cross the border.158  This issue is extremely important to the 
Russians, as it is with the Chinese.  Flooding the Russian Far East with the North 
Koreans will cause more domestic instability in Russia, something that they 
would rather not have in their current situation. 
In the end, Russia fears that an economic collapse would bring in money 
and influence from China, Japan, and the United States.  Because of their geo-
strategic importance, Russia does not want to see China or Japan take a more 
dominant role on the peninsula.  “Russia will continue to have a strategic interest 
in the Korean peninsula, because it is a possible base for attack and because it 
shares with Japan control of the Tsushima Strait and coastline of the East Sea 
(Sea of Japan).  Thus they will endeavor to minimize Chinese or Japanese 
influence over Korea.”159  The presence of the United States military forces on 
the peninsula no longer threatens the Russian nation.  In fact, Russia would be 
wary of predominant Chinese power on the peninsula forcing out the American 
troops prior to the complete stabilization of the peninsula.  Based on relations 
between Russia and the United States at the time, Russia could be against the 
American military presence and a strong U.S.-Korean alliance once the 
peninsula is stable.  Having a unified Korea with a strong American ally could 
mean a “forward military base on Russia’s doorstep” and an “Asian version of 
NATO’s eastward expansion”.160  Russia maintains that it supports reunification 
on the terms of the Korean people; however they are not in favor of a 
reunification unaccommodating of Russia’s interests.  In particular, a dominant 
position by China or Japan on the Korean peninsula would be very unfavorable 
                                            
158  Seung-Ho Joo, "Russia and the Six Party Talks," Vantage Point (May 20, 2004). 
159  Joo, "Russia and the Korean Peace Process," 163.  
160  Joo, "Russia and the Korean Peace Process," 164.  
63 
to the Russian government.  In the end, a unified Korea could potentially serve 
as a counterbalance to a potential threat from Japan or the Chinese. 
E.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF INTER-KOREAN OR 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
1. Options for Russia 
Russia is likely to try and play a greater role in a unified Korea if the two 
Koreas were left to decide their own fate and peacefully integrate through 
gradual diplomacy.  It is possible that, as a part of a gradual and diplomatic 
resolution of reunification, United States troops might be removed from the 
Korean peninsula.  While American forces have already been mandated to slowly 
decrease their numbers on the peninsula, Chinese influence could result in the 
complete removal.  American forces on the peninsula have acted in the past as a 
check to an expansion of the Japanese military.  Once this check has 
disappeared, a unified Korea might see the need to align with another nation in 
the region for their security while they rebuild their economy and infrastructure.  
Since both North and South Korea have strong alliances with China and the 
United States, seeking Russia’s help can be seen as a compromise to both 
parties.  Russia should use this opportunity to align with Korea and provide the 
military security and a nuclear umbrella while the unified Korea develops.  
Whether Russia will be able to militarily support the Korean nation against a 
strong Japanese threat is a deeper question, however, they could support the 
peninsula with troops that would otherwise be placed along the border to aid 
refugees.  Prior to unification, Russia should replace the American forces located 
on the Korean peninsula.  Neutral Russian troops will provide a domestic 
peaceful structure and an external security force while not threatening either of 
the Korean states.161 
Another way that Russia may play a greater role in a unified Korea would 
be for the major superpowers to turn the peninsula into a neutral state and 
therefore eliminate any conflict between them.162  By turning the Korean 
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peninsula into a neutral state, Russia would play a greater role economically and 
politically in the Asian region as it helps a unified Korea preserve its 
independence and territorial integrity.  Even though Korean neutrality would be 
viewed as an interim solution, it would help Russia to achieve many goals.  First, 
potential security threats to the Far East and their sea routes would decrease 
since a neutral state would have an extremely minor chance of stationing troops 
from one of the major powers on the peninsula.  Second, a neutral Korea would 
have little reason to pursue a nuclear status since it would have no real enemies 
to fight against.  Third, a neutral Korea would mean more spent on the economy 
and social programs and less on defense.  Finally, Russia would be able to fight 
internationally as one of the sponsors of Korea’s neutrality.163  Since Russia 
currently has a relationship with both North and South Korea, they are more likely 
to play a role in a neutral state than one that favors China or the United States.   
Russia sees economic opportunities from both North and South Korea.  
They hope to link a trans-Siberian railroad through the Korean peninsula to open 
the markets of Europe and Asia to one another.  Russia wishes to have a role in 
the infrastructure that would link Russian resources into both North and South 
Korea.164  Russia has already assisted in building North Korean plants and 
industrial facilities in the past.  Now that they need to be updated and 
overhauled, it is only logical that the Russians renew the systems that they have 
built.  Another multilateral project that Russia could be in the forefront of is the 
Siberian gas development plan.  Upon completion, the gas fields will provide a 
projected 20 million tons of natural gas to China, Russia, and Korea.  The 
pipeline’s construction will be instrumental in reducing natural gas prices to 
Korea by 22-25 percent.165  The rising need for gas and oil in the Asian region 
will make Russia a desired partner.  Projects like the Irkutsk gas program and the 
railroad program will lead to Russia’s greater influence in the unified Korea. 
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2.   Effects on Russia 
Through the gradual reunification process Russia understands that their 
economy could well be turned around as they take a more active economic and 
political role in the future unified Korea.  A number of understandings were 
reached in order to reactivate economic bilateral cooperation between Russia 
and the DPRK.  They include the following:  revitalization of ties between 
Russian organizations and North Korean industries that were built under Soviet 
assistance; joint development of magnetite and coal deposits; resumption of 
cargo shipment lines; construction of the gas pipeline; repayment of the DPRK’s 
debts to the Soviets; the establishment of joint ventures; and modernization of 
Soviet-built enterprises in South Korea.166  All of these agreements could 
increase their influence over the peninsula as well as benefit the Russian 
economy. 
Russia wants to resume more of an active role as a mediator between the 
two Koreas as they hold summits on the issue of reunification.  They are wary of 
North Korea’s attempt to hold bilateral talks with Washington.  If talks with 
Pyongyang were to result in a peace treaty with Washington, then Russia will 
have lost their influence.  If American interests were to dominate, Russia would 
be in danger of having their interests ignored.  Russian diplomats have stressed 
that American interests do not necessarily correlate to Moscow’s, a reason why 
they need to maintain some sort of influence at least over North Korea.167  
Russians will need to exert their influence over both of the Korean states to 
secure their position over a future reunified Korea. 
F. NATIONAL OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA 
1.   Russian Factors to Shape a Future Korea 
North and South Korea have many factors which will shape how Russia 
looks at and applies policy toward their eventual unification.  Russia, like most of 
the other nations, sees an agreement on military nuclear disarmament of North 
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Korea as one of the most important factors before there can be a unification.  
After proposing multilateral collaboration and talks since 1997 to disentangle the 
nuclear problem on the peninsula, Russia was first invited into the Six-Party 
Talks in August 2003.168  It was because of the United States’ entanglement in 
Iraq and North Korea’s insistence that they would provide a more fair and neutral 
outlook that Russia was brought to the table.  Despite this close relationship with 
Kim Jong-il, Russia still sends out clear messages that if the DPRK were to cross 
the “red line” by going nuclear, it would be “unacceptable” and would force 
Russia to collaborate with United States-led international sanctions or even a 
military attack.169  Russia along with China is still indecisive as to whether North 
Korea actually possesses reprocessed plutonium weapons.  However, they are 
fighting for the right for the DPRK to use their nuclear reactors for energy.170  
This is a problem since the United States does not trust North Korean officials 
after International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were kicked out and 
weapons were produced in what was supposed to be civilian energy producing 
reactors. 
  Another factor which will shape unification is an occupation of the 
peninsula by one of the major powers.  Any power that threatens the security of 
Far Eastern Russia will undermine whatever advantages could come about from 
a unified Korea.  The balance of power could be shifted if China were to take 
control over the peninsula and move the American forces out of the way.  On the 
other hand, if Washington were to have control over the unified Korea, China 
would be wary of an American presence along their border.  This would result in 
a security threat to China and a build-up of their military along the Korean border.  
Russia would be affected by the increase in tensions.  Two remaining factors are 
also the flow of refugees across the Russian border and the economic potential 
that relations with a unified Korea will have for Russia.  All of these factors must 
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be considered carefully by the Russian government prior to adopting a policy 
which should be taken. 
2.   Best Case Scenario 
In terms of unification, the best case scenario for Russia would be to unify 
under a “neutral Korea” approach.  Russian foreign policy states that “the 
situation on the Korean peninsula gives rise to the greatest concern.  Russia’s 
efforts will be concentrated on ensuring our country’s full and equal participation 
in efforts to settle the Korean problem and on maintaining balanced relations with 
both Korean states.”171  The society could be a “limited” open society in which it 
is not under Chinese, United States, or Japanese influence.  It would establish 
free markets in this “limited” open society as well as a liberal democracy.  
Russians should continue in their economic ventures on the peninsula by 
creating a free trade union which will include the entire Northeast Asian 
region.172  By linking the railroads and transport networks from Korea’s Pacific 
ports to Russia, Korean markets would open up to Europe and Russia.173  This 
would establish Russia and not the other major powers as having the economic 
advantage over the peninsula.  Also in this scenario, Russia should establish 
close political coordination in international forums with Korea without exchanging 
any mutual defense commitments.  If no mutual defense commitments were 
established, then there would be no allies or enemies among the other major 
powers.  Beijing and Washington could not establish a hold over the peninsula.  
Lastly, Russia would serve as the mediator for the influences of the United 
States, China, and Japan in Northeast Asia.   
Due to their geographic proximity, Russia cannot be passive and 
disinterested in the unification of the peninsula despite its domestic and internal 
problems.  The desire for stability and economic development throughout the 
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peninsula gives Russia an incentive to be a part of the unification process.  The 
best case in which they can be a major part of this unification process is if the 
two Korean states were to become a unified neutral nation and use their 
friendship with Russia to deal with the other major powers in the Northeast Asian 
region. 
3.   Worst Case Scenario 
The worst case reunification scenario for the Russian nation would be if 
the two Koreas were to unify under a strong military.  The emergence of a unified 
70 million man Korea with nuclear and chemical weapons within close proximity, 
threatens the security of Russia.  This dangerous reunification would pit the 
neighbors against one another as they tried to destabilize the region.  Russian 
influence over the Korean nation in this scenario with regards to a militarized 
Korea would be minimal.  They would also feel a security threat to their borders 
as China, the United States, and Japan tried to deal with a Korean military threat.  
A reunified Korea with a strong military would mean that United States or China 
might eventually have to take control of the Korean peninsula through either 
military or diplomatic means such as the United Nations.  This military reaction 
might bring the people of Korea under another strong power which could directly 
threaten the bordering Russian Far East’s security.  The development of 
economic projects would be under the scrutiny and control of either China or the 
United States.  Under this scenario, one of the other major powers would exert 
their influence and push Russia farther out of the Korean peninsula both on 
economic and diplomatic terms. 
4.   Policy Approaches 
Russia has two extreme scenarios which it should consider before making 
any policy in regards to Korean reunification.  The best case scenario as 
discussed previously would likely put them as the most influential partner to a 
reunified Korea.  Their authority could be more powerful than that of China or the 
United States and Japan.  On the other hand, if the worst case scenario were to 
become a reality, not only would Russia suffer from a security threat directly 
along their border, but the more powerful and expansive militaries such as China 
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and the United States would have more control and say over the peninsula since 
it would become a military operation.   
Despite these one sided scenarios it is more likely that a reunified Korea 
will align with a dominant power, either China or the United States.  It will be 
better for Russia if there was a balance between the two powers on the 
peninsula.  To gain the maximum amount of leverage with China and the United 
States on the peninsula, Russia will have to continue to support both North and 
South Korea in their equidistant policy to resume its “great-power role” regarding 
the peninsula.  By doing this for the North and the South Koreans, Russia will 
gain leverage and influence on the peninsula by acting as a friend and confidant 
to both sides.  This is an obvious advantage over the United States which has no 
relationship with the North Korean government or any dealings with their 
economy.  Russia must continue to let the North Koreans know of Russia’s 
position if they were to test a nuclear weapon as well as their position toward the 
United States of any possible economic sanctions that could come as a result of 
United Nations direct action.   
Despite the claims by other nations that the North Koreans have the 
nuclear capabilities because of borrowed Russian technology, Russia might take 
the lead in cleaning up the nuclear program by volunteering their nuclear 
scientists to inspect and “clean up” DPRK facilities.  Because Russian scientists 
already know the Korean equipment, Russia should try to cut a deal where their 
scientists will go into the North before UN inspectors do.  They can stand before 
the world and testify as a third party about the actual status of the nuclear 
program.  This action will go a long way toward gaining sway over the peninsula 
once reunification takes place.    
Russia’s objectives along the Korean peninsula are the following:  
maintaining stability on the peninsula; maintaining balanced relations between 
the two Korean states; helping with the inter-Korean dialogue; cooperating with 
the other big powers; and opposing domination of the peninsula by outside 
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forces.174 Russia should continue their position in Six-Party Talks as a moderator 
and friend to all sides of the table.  They also should take a more active role in 
the Korean economy by bringing in their European Economic Union ties to the 
peninsula while also building up railroad and oil relationships.  Because of 
Russian involvement with Europe, the EEU can give North Korea access to 
additional humanitarian and economic assistance.175  By doing all of these 
actions as well as supporting the transformation of the peninsula into a nuclear 
weapons free zone and backing it by a guarantee of nuclear security over a 
unified Korea, Russia will guarantee that they have a diplomatic place on the 
peninsula after reunification takes place.  Will Russia regain the power of 
coercion that they once had during the Cold War?  They probably will never have 
the same influence over a reunified Korea that they once had over the DPRK.  
However, through these actions they will become a part of an international group 
that can sway and influence the Korean peninsula toward prosperity. 
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V. WILL THE UNITED STATES HOLD INFLUENCE OVER A 
REUNIFIED KOREA 
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
American foreign policy towards North Korea began, in a sense, even 
before the division between the South and the North.  It is the history of American 
foreign policy that some could argue, led to the eventual division and the creation 
of two Korean states.  When the Japanese were allowed to claim Korea as their 
“colony”, the United States stepped back and let Japan, which they viewed as an 
equal at that time, imperialize the peninsula as long as they would not grab any 
new colonies.176   It was not until 1943, that discussions were made to free the 
Korean people.  The three big powers (United States, England, and China) met 
at the Cairo Conference and determined that Korea’s suppression by the 
Japanese would end and “in due course, Korea shall become free and 
independent”.177  The wording of “in due course” was created by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt who thought that Asian countries needed time to 
mature before they could be independent.  He suggested to Stalin that after forty 
years Koreans should be able to rule themselves.   
Soviet forces were quick to send troops to Manchuria and northern Korea 
once they declared war on Japan.  Washington realized that Russian occupation 
of Korea would have severe military consequences for the future of Asia.178  
Therefore, once the Soviets were present on the peninsula and it was obvious 
that the Japanese would surrender, the United States suggested that they divide 
the peninsula temporarily at the 38th parallel.  The decision had been made in 
haste and without the help of any Korea experts.  Washington had no clue that 
they had just divided the peninsula into the same spheres of influence that 
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Russians and Japanese had discussed earlier in the century.179  The Soviet 
Union would accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in the north and the 
United States would accept the surrender in the south.  While the Russians 
aimed at developing a communist state in the North, the United States aimed at 
the growth of an independent nation, yet made no preparations to even 
temporarily take over South Korea.180  Trying to work out an agreement with the 
Soviet Union to unite the two halves, the United States agreed to administer the 
country together for five years through a joint commission.  Distrust and 
accusations led the two sides to get nothing accomplished during the first two 
meetings of the joint commission in 1946 and 1947.181  The United States, afraid 
of the South falling into communist hands, looked to the United Nations to solve 
their problems.  In November, 1947, the United Nations passed a resolution that 
would call for free elections in the part of Korea controlled by the UN, the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the formation of a UN commission to 
oversee Korea.  The Soviet Union, frustrated with the results, boycotted the vote 
on the resolution.  On May 10, 1948 the “free” elections in the south elected 
Syngman Rhee, a United States backed anti-communist president.  On 
September 9, 1948, in response to the south’s declaration, the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) was declared under the leadership of Kim 
Il-Sung, the new prime minister.182  Only three years following the liberation of 
the Korean peninsula from the Japanese, there were two separate states with 
two separate political systems and divided by a line guarded by military forces. 
B. HISTORY AFTER KOREA’S DIVISION 
The DPRK served as a constant threat to the United States’ interests as it 
was led by a communist regime and heavily backed by the Soviet Union.  
American foreign policy changed over the next sixty years as Washington related 
to the North Korean government.  Following World War II, the United States was 
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more interested in containing Russian power and the spread of communism than 
in developing and reunifying Korea.  Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
advocated his plan to extend financial assistance in order to repeal communism 
to the rest of war-torn Europe.  Over the four years of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. 
gave approximately 13.3 billion dollars to contain communism, however, none of 
that money was given to Asia.  Korea, which faced the biggest threat directly to 
their north, should have evoked fear in Washington of communism controlling the 
peninsula.183  However, even with Russian influence in North Korea, the United 
States still did not include Korea in part of the Marshall Plan.  Washington was 
not worried about North Korea and Americans’ Far East Asia policy displayed 
their lack of concern. 
The United States was unquestionably not prepared for the North Korean 
attack across the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea.  Amassing only limited 
troops in South Korea, the American military was quickly run over from the 
northern invasion.  Based on historical accounts, Washington had two different 
expectations of the Soviet Union at this time.  First off, Washington thought there 
was no immediate danger of an attack in North Korea because the Soviets were 
to use their forces somewhere else in the world to promote Communism.184  
This, of course, was based on U.S thought that Korea was much too small of a 
prize for the Soviet Union to be concerned with.  The second expectation of the 
Soviets was that they would not engage in obvious aggression because it would 
result in a total war with the United States.185  Because American strategists 
could not foresee a reason based on their expectations to employ American 
forces in defense of South Korea, they were unprepared for what would happen 
on June 25, 1950.  Korea was simply not viewed as a place of strategic 
importance and U.S. leaders did not believe that the DPRK would act on its own 
and not on behalf of Soviet foreign policy.  If South Korea were under attack, 
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Washington believed before June 25, 1950 that the matter would be handled by 
the United Nations.  Secretary of State Acheson made this known in a major 
policy speech titled “Crisis in China-An Examination of United States Policy” in 
January of 1950.  In it he echoed the statement that any attack on South Korea 
would be met with United Nations action.186  However, the United States reacted 
quickly to the North Korean aggression as they changed their policy overnight 
and deployed troops to a part of the world which had been previously considered 
outside their defensive perimeter. 
 The North Korean invasion into South Korea on June 25, 1950 was a 
pinnacle event that changed American foreign policy.  Washington knew the 
implications that this action would have in the Cold War and knew that they 
should act.  American forces were initially to be used to suppress the extension 
of Communism in the South.  However, when the tides of war changed and 
General MacArthur and his forces chased the North Koreans into the north, 
Chinese soldiers would come to the aid of the North Koreans.  The UN forces 
would be pushed back and made to give way to a standoff once again at the 38th 
parallel.  An armistice would eventually be drafted in 1953 which would halt the 
war but not end it.  The United States and South Korea signed a mutual defense 
treaty on October 1, 1953, declaring that American troops would remain in place 
in South Korea.  The treaty agreed that the parties will “maintain and develop 
appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in 
consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty.”187   With this treaty, a 
special security relationship between the United States and the ROK had been 
made.   
The United States’ relationship with Korea is dichotomous since it has had 
a diminished relationship with the North while maintaining a “special” relationship 
with the South.  The South Korean government has had in place for many years 
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the “Sunshine Policy”, first introduced by President Kim Dae Jung, which it 
believes will help the two halves of the nation to unite in the future.188  In order to 
maintain this special balance and relationship with the South Koreans, 
Washington considered softening its approach and respecting the Sunshine 
Policy.  The three guiding principles of the Sunshine Policy were the following:  
No armed provocation by the north was to be tolerated; the south will not attempt 
to absorb the North; and the South seeks cooperation with the North.189  The 
Policy believes that there can be political and economic relationships between 
the United States and Japan with the North Koreans.  It has several policy 
guidelines: an inter-Korean dialogue will be upheld; South Korea will provide 3.2 
billion dollars to construct two light-water reactors; politics and business will be 
separated so that the limits of South Korean investment will be waived; 
humanitarian aid will be provided to the North; and family reunions are 
encouraged.190  Based on this policy and in order to keep good relations with the 
South Korean government, the American policy under President Clinton needed 
to take a more engaging position as well.  Based on this change in policy, the 
Clinton administration drafted and agreed on the Agreed Framework of 1994. 
Under the stipulations of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Korean Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) was founded with Japan, South Korea, and 
other European Union nations joining in.  The Agreement stated that the North 
Koreans were to completely abandon their nuclear weapons program.  Old 
reactors were to be shut down and dismantled.  Spent fuel rods were to be 
contained and removed from North Korea and sent elsewhere where it would be 
supervised as part of the North Korean compliance.  North Korea also was 
engaged in dialogue with the South and implemented the 1991 North-South 
denuclearization declaration.  Last but not least, the North was to fully comply 
with IAEA standards and let inspectors into their state to examine their 
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program.191  The United States also had obligations under this Framework.  
Washington was to found KEDO, build two new light water reactors -- of which 
the first one was to be done by 2003, provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per 
year until the reactors are finished, and provide a formal assurance of security 
against a military or nuclear threat.192  This Agreement was meant to be the 
answer to all of the U.S-DPRK problems that had faced them prior to making this 
accord.  Since KEDO was formed and the United States and their allies began to 
conform to the Agreement, there was approximately 1.3 billion dollars spent.  
Before the second reactor has been entirely built, the North Koreans were to be 
in full compliance of the IAEA standards.  According to U.S. Ambassador Charles 
Pritchard, KEDO was on course to provide the North Koreans with a significant 
portion of the reactor project by 2005, and with full cooperation by Pyongyang the 
IAEA would have been able to verify the completeness of the termination of their 
nuclear program within 3-4 years.193 
Since the 1990s the United States’ foreign policy towards North Korea has 
mainly consisted of two developments: a response to North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program and massive food shortages.  In 1995 the U.S. officially began 
giving assistance to North Korea through energy assistance in KEDO, food aid, 
and a small amount of medical supplies.194  Energy assistance was arranged 
under the Agreed Framework of 1994.  After KEDO had been formed, 
Washington financed two light water reactors and heavy fuel oil was to be sent to 
North Korea.  Since North Korea’s admittance of their nuclear weapons program, 
energy assistance has been terminated.  The other major portion of assistance 
from the United States comes in the form of food and medical aid.  In the 1990s 
there were massive food shortages in the North that led to millions of deaths.  It 
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was estimated that food shortages and lack of proper medical care led to the 
death of between five and ten percent of the North’s population.195  Food aid has 
been primarily given to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP).  It is 
speculated that food that is directly given to the DPRK government will be given 
to the elite Koreans and military, not the poor who truly need it.  The United 
States has sent assistance worth over $600 million.196  North Korea has 
regulated the international relief agency’s operation in the country and uses the 
food as they deem needed.   
Since the inception of the Beijing talks to discuss the North Korean 
nuclear program, Pyongyang admitted to a U.S. diplomat that they possessed 
nuclear weapons and they were close to reprocessing the spent fuel rods to 
produce five or six nuclear weapons.  Washington fears that North Korea will 
“prove” through a physical demonstration the extent of their nuclear 
capabilities.197  There has yet to be such a demonstration, however, the Beijing 
Six Party Talks have not reached an agreement.  Washington stands firm that 
North Korea needs to completely dismantle their nuclear program before they 
can resume reunification goals.  How Washington will help North and South 
Korea along their reunification path will also determine their authority once they 
are a united Korea.  The United States needs to be prepared for Korean 
reunification however it may occur, so that it can be a major influence on the 
entire Korean peninsula. 
C. REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR 
1. Options for the United States 
Washington has stated many times over the years since the end of the 
1994 Agreement that it would like to resolve the nuclear program on the Korean 
peninsula in a peaceful manner.  Yet, Washington is clear that the use of military 
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action to end the nuclear threat in North Korea is never off of the table.  While 
both sides stand firm in blaming the other for the standstill in the Six Party Talks, 
it is possible that war is the only option that each one can foresee.  In 
Washington’s case, the Bush administration has taken their preemption policy to 
the forefront by invading Iraq and getting rid of Saddam Hussein and his 
government.  North Korea was listed with Iraq as one of the “Axis of Evil” nations.  
Of course it would be logical for Kim Jong-il to believe that they would be next.  
While international support for the invasion of Iraq continues to decrease as 
American troops are still deployed in Iraq to control the peace, an invasion of 
North Korea may be even less supported.  Washington would rely heavily on 
intelligence that North Korea would use their nuclear weapons against South 
Korea, Japan, or even the United States, since it is assumed that North Korean 
weapons might be able to hit the islands of Hawaii.  More importantly, the threat 
is greater that North Korea will sell their nuclear fissile materials and weapons.  
North Korea’s economic decline coinciding with catastrophic floods could 
threaten the Kim regime if dissatisfied elites wanted change.  While North Korea 
is currently trying to extort aid from the international community, “carrots” in 
exchange for his nuclear program, if all else fails, it is possible that the DPRK 
could resort to selling their nuclear material on the black market.198  The United 
States has recognized that there are several potential buyers if North Korea were 
to sell their weapons.  Obvious buyers of the materials other than Al Queda 
would include Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Yemen which have all had arms transfers 
with the North Koreans in the past.  Other less obvious states could also be 
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Venezuela.199  In any of these cases, if a nuclear 
weapon or nuclear fissile material would get into these states’ hands, the effects 
could be more unacceptable to the United States than the repercussions of a 
pre-emptive attack on North Korea.  Only in the case of North Korea taking their 
nuclear program to the black market would Washington risk the retort by the 
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international community’s critical retort that the United States is fighting another 
“groundless” war. 
It is more likely though that if the DPRK’s leaders feel that their regime is 
in jeopardy, they will scramble to hold onto their power.  Possible reasons for 
North Korea to act in this manner are: a fear of being attacked by the United 
States in a preemptive action, an imminent collapse, or a last ditch effort to 
reunify when it appeared that there was no other hope for peaceful reunification.  
They can use the Vietnamese unification as their model since North Vietnam 
forcefully absorbed South Vietnam when it was apparent that it would not reunify 
peacefully under two hostile political systems.200  If North Korea were to take this 
aggressive action, they have their antiquated but numerous conventional forces, 
to lash out over the DMZ and try to reunite the peninsula on their terms.  They 
can send missiles to both Japan and South Korea.  More than likely China and 
Russia would be safe from North Korean weapons.  Pyongyang would lash out at 
the United States and its alliances.  Under this scenario, the United States would 
support its bilateral treaty with South Korea and defend that state.  The United 
Nations might be used if a resolution were to be passed, however both China 
and Russia could serve to veto the action in the UN Security Council if it were to 
be brought up.  Therefore, the United States military will defend the South 
Koreans while also pushing Kim Jong-il out of control.  Japan would support the 
American forces from far away.  They will need to be careful not to place 
Japanese military on the Korean peninsula before historical relations have been 
resolved.  If this were to occur before the end of the Iraqi occupation, Washington 
will need to redeploy thousands of troops onto the peninsula and create a long 
term plan until the North has been controlled and the reunification progress is 
under way on peaceful terms. 
2.   Effects on the United States 
The effects on the United States would be similar if an aggressive action 
were taken by the North Koreans or the United States preemptively acted in that 
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American forces would be shifted toward the Korean peninsula for another long 
term occupation.  Once the DPRK realizes that they will be dissolved by the 
American and South Korean military, they might take action to either detonate a 
nuclear weapon toward one of their enemies or sell the information on the black 
market.  The United States will want immediate accountability of the nuclear 
equipment and all of the plutonium rods.  The direct access by the military and 
technical inspectors will present Seoul with diplomatic and alliance challenges 
right away.201  In either case Washington would be very worried about the long 
term effects of a nuclear weapon from North Korea.  If the United States has 
gone in on its own without aggressive provocation from North Korea and without 
approval from the United Nations, which will not happen while Russia and China 
are able to veto action by Washington, then Washington will again suffer the dire 
consequences of the international community perceiving it as being a “cowboy” 
and going it alone.  Even South Korea has stated that they would not support 
American action against Pyongyang if it has been initiated preemptively.202 
The effects of a war on the peninsula would most likely mean tens of 
thousands of casualties and devastating consequences to the peninsula’s 
infrastructure.  Aid and investments by NGOs which normally have gone to 
rebuilding the economy and helping the North Korean people to recover from 
famine and health issues now would be needed to pump into the war efforts to 
stop the Kim Jong-il regime from using a nuclear weapon.  This would play a role 
in Washington’s defense spending as more troops would need to be sent over a 
period of time until the peninsula has been reunified under peaceful terms.  The 
last important effect from American troops being on the peninsula and marching 
up through North Korea is the China threat.  China has been benefiting from the 
Korean division for the past sixty years as North Korea has served as a buffer 
from the democratic state of South Korea and its American influence.  Once a 
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war has begun and the American troops have taken control of the North Korean 
state, there will no longer be that buffer.  Depending on relations at the time 
between Beijing and Washington, there might be heightened tensions along that 
border.  The war and impending unification of Korea might threaten China’s 
security to the point that there is no longer a balance in the Asian region. 
D.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF THE DPRK’S COLLAPSE 
1. Options for the United States 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it was suspected among political 
elites around the world that North Korea would fall in the same way.  In South 
Korea, the eventual collapse even led President Roh Tae Woo to order nine 
governmental bodies to prepare plans for managing the absorption of the 
North.203  Despite this widely held assumption in the 1990s, the Pyongyang 
regime has been able to survive past famine and floods to maintain their position 
of leadership in the North Korean state.  As discussed in Chapter one, the 
triggering event for a governmental collapse could either come as mass disorder 
from the people “crumbling from below”, or there could be a elite coup, 
“crumbling from above”.204  Either one of these triggering events will need 
external intervention by either a joint U.S.-ROK alliance or a multinational force 
under the UN.205  Washington should stress that they would work under the hat 
of a United Nations multinational force if a collapse were to occur.  If this path 
were executed by the United States, it would appear to the North and South 
Koreans that Americans, under the UN flag are not occupying the peninsula to 
impose their will on the new unified government.  The United States has 
experienced decreasing popularity among the South Korean government and 
their population since the Bush administration has taken office in Washington.206  
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South Korea has been divided over how Washington has been dealing with North 
Korea.  If the United States were to come onto the peninsula to aid in the 
collapse in the North, regardless of our history together with the Korean War, it 
would not be embraced as readily as if a multinational force under the UN flag 
were to be used. 
Another problem that the United States and the possible UN multinational 
force will have to face is integration of socioeconomic and political problems.  All 
of the problems that will be encountered are ones that will be dealt with under the 
scenario of a war, however, even with a collapse of their political power the North 
Koreans might not have been completely distinguished.  Therefore, policies for 
intervening in the collapsed government and administering policies such as 
border control, currency conversion, and enfranchisement will be unpopular 
among the North Korean people.207  The United States will be involved in 
dilemmas that arise from any regional security problems resulting from a change 
in the Korean status quo.  If Washington is involved in this way, it gives South 
Korea the opportunity to direct their attention towards reunification efforts while 
the United States takes care of the external problems.208  If Washington were to 
take on this role, it would benefit the United States greatly in maintaining a 
special relationship with unified Koreans despite the fact that the North Korean 
threat has dissipated. 
A last option that the United States must consider to maintain an influential 
American military presence on the peninsula is to revamp the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) for Korea.  If South Korea is to incur all of the costs to rebuild 
their unified nation, then it is more likely that the American military will be 
welcome to stay and aid in reunification efforts if Washington would change the 
Status of Forces agreement.  Despite the recent changes made to the Korean 
SOFA in 2000, it is still unequal in American treatment of the Korean people.  In 
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a letter written to Secretary Rumsfeld, Bishop John H. Ricard, SSJ, of 
Pensacola-Tallahassee wrote that the Korean SOFA is “provoking new and 
widespread anti-USA sentiment among the Korean people, who in fact feel that 
their national pride and sovereignty have been undermined and trampled 
underfoot."209  The Korean people are subjected to a SOFA which is more 
restrictive than those for Japan and Germany.  The major point of contention 
which the United States should change is paying rent for the bases and facilities 
rather than having the South Korean government pay the price.210  With this 
revision, the South Koreans will be more apt to maintain the American forces in 
their bases since they will no longer need to pay for their rent.  If Washington 
were to modify this stipulation, it will be more likely that an American military 
presence would remain. 
2.   Effects on the United States 
It is uncertain whether a collapse will occur as the result of an explosion 
over a few short weeks or erosion that takes five to ten years, if at all.  However, 
if the United States does not get China, Russia, and South Korea onboard with 
economic sanctions, external nations could support the North Korean regime 
instead of them reforming and truly living up to the juche philosophy.  With the 
continuance of economic sanctions and lack of support for the UN food aid 
program, the prospects for a gradual reunification would be reduced.  The 
biggest problem that could rise is a growing factionalism within the DPRK 
government in which South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia could all 
manipulate the power groups in Pyongyang.211  More than likely there will not be 
a rising pro-United States power located within Pyongyang unless major 
improvements in foreign relations occur in the few years before a collapse takes 
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place.  Once power groups rise out of Pyongyang, it is likely that a pro-China 
group will make their impact and give China more of an influential edge over the 
United States.  There could be instability that rises out of this factionalism and 
consequences could include massive numbers of refugees to South Korea, “boat 
people” into Japan, and civil strife which could result in military encounters.212  
The United States could serve as the coordinator between China, Japan, and 
other regional players for refugee relocation as well as search and rescue (SAR) 
missions in the waters surrounding the peninsula.213 
The spillover of the collapse into military strife would be the last ditch effort 
of Kim Jong-il to save his regime before he was pushed aside by external 
powers.  American forces might be asked to provide aid in pushing aside the 
DPRK’s military efforts, or it might be on the smaller scale of providing logistics 
and intelligence support as the South Korean military takes on the major role of 
fighting in North Korea.   The United States, however, will want immediate 
accountability of all nuclear-related equipment just as they would within a war-
time scenario.214  This might pose a problem if Seoul is unwilling to let the 
American forces into the North Korean region. 
E.  REUNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF INTER-KOREAN OR 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
1. Options for the United States 
The two Koreas have been earnestly proposing the terms for a diplomatic 
and peaceful reunification since their division.  The Korean War could actually be 
considered one of the North’s very early steps toward achieving reunification.  
Despite all out war, Kim Il Sung initially put forth his confederation system 
proposal in the 1960s and went on to explain it in detail in Kim Il Sung’s Ten-
Point Program for the Great Unity of the Korean People for Unification in 1993.  
Kim’s confederation proposal retains the two sides’ current powers and interests, 
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yet creates a good environment for future reunification at some point in the 
future. 215  South Korea’s proposal which was put forward by Roh Tae Woo in 
1989, calls for a Korean Commonwealth.  Under the Commonwealth, using the 
European community and the British Commonwealth as an example, the Korean 
people will share common values and traditions while being separated by divided 
systems.  The South Korean plan uses exchange and reconciliation to prepare 
the northern half of the peninsula for reunification through absorption.216   
The United States, however, has been committed to a “permanent peace” 
on the peninsula and in order for this to happen Washington believes the first 
step is to rid the peninsula of its nuclear program.  The United Sates has taken 
North Korea’s nuclear program very seriously and undertaken the role of neither 
appeasing nor promoting a warlike stance in order to end the program.  During 
the Beijing Six-Party Talks, they have brought up the idea of economic sanctions 
to push North Korea toward reformation; however this subject has been 
extremely controversial.  Together, China, Russia, and South Korea are against 
the use of economic sanctions or even bringing the issue up to the United 
Nations for fear that it would, in turn, cause North Korea to lash out.  The only 
stipulation was made by Russia which stated that they could see the use of 
sanctions if there is no result from diplomatic negotiations.   
Washington’s major positions with regard to Korean policy are:  a 
continuing priority with Iraq means that the administration does not want two 
wars being fought at the same time; progressive suspension of the Agreed 
Framework; ambivalence toward negotiations with North Korea; forming an 
international coalition to end the Northern nuclear program; possible economic 
sanctions on North Korea if they do not end the nuclear program; and a U.S. 
military option if North Korea fully activates its nuclear program.217  While this 
was the administration policy as of April, 2003, there have been slight 
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modifications since the beginning of the Beijing nuclear talks.  As of June 24, 
2004, Washington offered Pyongyang a new two phase proposition.  In the initial 
phase, North Korea would sign a declaration to totally dismantle their nuclear 
weapons program under outside supervision.218  Following this, they would open 
up their nuclear facilities for inspection.  While this is happening, the United 
States would draft a multilateral security guarantee which would respect their 
sovereignty and would conduct a survey of the North’s energy needs.  During this 
phase, Washington would seek to engage in bilateral talks with Pyongyang in 
order to work out a timetable for nuclear compliance.  During the second phase, 
North Korea would remove nuclear material and agree to long term monitoring.  
Following this, the United States would provide the assistance to dismantle the 
facilities and include the IAEA in this endeavor.219  Basically the policy would be 
for the North Koreans to provide proof that they are dismantling prior to the 
United States giving them any benefits.   
Parties of the Beijing talks met again in early August 2005 and the United 
States held bilateral talks with the North Korean officials as part of the Beijing 
talks while again stating that they would not attack the DPRK.  Nothing was 
accomplished at these talks.  However, North Korea was able to receive an 
electricity pledge, additional food aid and widened cooperation from South 
Korea.220  North-South Korean relations have hit an all time high.  This became 
evident as a crowd of 60,000 South Koreans cheered, “We are one” to a group of 
visiting North Koreans during the 2005 independence celebration from Japanese 
rule.221  Meanwhile the relationship with the United States seems to be splitting 
as South Korea went against Washington’s policy and gave their stamp of 
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approval for a peaceful North Korean nuclear program.222  While Pyongyang has 
reached an agreement with the other nations, they will meet again in November 
2005 to discuss implementation.  Nonetheless, if Washington desires to end the 
military nuclear threat from North Korea, and overcome the standstill which has 
been apparent for many years, they should accede to North Korea’s plan to 
maintain their nuclear program for peaceful purposes.  There would be strict 
conditions placed on the program. These conditions would include:  a reactor 
complex that is staffed by South Koreans or international personnel, the reactor 
would be subject to strict IAEA controls, and North Korea would rejoin the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty upon agreement.223  If Washington were to 
acquiesce on this subject, it would place the onus on the North Koreans to abide 
by the international rules that are set forth while the Americans would appear to 
support the reunification of the two Korean states. 
Another option for Washington to prove that it supports the reunification of 
the two Koreas is the reduction of military troops.  This reduction policy has 
already been established to incrementally withdraw the 37,000 forces stationed 
in Korea down to only 12,500 by 2008. Washington should also return the 
Yongsan Garrison to the ROK and move the smaller remaining American forces 
of about 1,000 personnel south of the 38th parallel.224  Despite what the 1992 
relocation talks stated, the United States should fund the move on their own and 
not with South Korean money which will be needed elsewhere.   There would be 
no need for the United Nations Combined Forces Command since their role was 
to deter war and defeat an external armed attack against South Korea if 
deterrence fails.225  A possible option would be to combine the United States 
Forces Koreas (USFK) and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) into a US 
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Northeast Asia Command (NEAC).  This would encompass both Japan and 
Korea and their regional threats.226  A continued American presence will promote 
stability upon reunification and reduce the possibility of the ROK leaning towards 
China.227  The small American force would be more expeditionary in nature and 
one that could deal with small-scale contingencies, can deter regional nations 
from destroying the balance of power, and can operate in a multinational and 
interagency environment.228  This would be a way for the South Koreans to feel 
less “occupied” by the American forces while Washington and Seoul can still 
retain the strategic benefits of having the American military on the peninsula.   
The North Koreans are feeling pressure from both South Korea and China 
to reform their economy.  While they do not want to threaten their political 
structure, it is evident that they are making strides to “open their doors” to reform.  
While it falls short of economic reform, their “open door” attitude is based on 
some of the following policies:  adoption of Joint Venture Law regulations; 
establishment of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone; loosening of centralized 
control over agricultural operations; and training opportunities abroad sponsored 
by the World Bank.229  As North Korea begins to stress their economy, the 
United States could, in exchange for a peace treaty ending the Korean War, give 
rewards to the North which will begin their working relationship.  Rewards could 
include normalizing formal relations, lifting economic sanctions, unfreezing North 
Korean assets in American banks ($15.45 million), and allowing American 
businessman to develop investment and trade relationships with North Korea.230 
Such an action would allow the United States to play an important role in the 
economic revival of the North and therefore, maintain this relationship post-
unification. 
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2.   Effects on the United States 
The United States has a vital interest in the security and stability of 
Northeast Asia.  Washington has enormous trade relationships with Japan, South 
Korea, and more recently, China.  The United States conducts over a third of its 
trade with the East Asian-Pacific region.231  Just as the economies in the 
Northeast Asian region are important, so are their militaries.  The militaries of 
China, Russia, and North Korea are three of the more powerful forces in Asia, 
while Japan has the most modern military force.232  The presence of American 
forces in South Korea and Japan has maintained stability in that region since the 
end of the Korean War.  The United States has provided naval and air superiority 
to each state which, if they had done it on their own, would have provoked an 
arms race.  Conversely, as American forces have protected Japan under their 
nuclear umbrella, there has been no reason for Japan to build their own nuclear 
program.  Washington would have to reassure Tokyo about the detrimental 
effects if they were to start their own nuclear program as well as build up their 
military.  All of this is stated with the intention that if American military forces were 
to be evacuated from the Korean peninsula as part of reunification stipulations, 
the balance between the nations might be disrupted.  Withdrawing American 
forces could cause a power vacuum which would lead to a conventional and 
nuclear arms race with devastating effects on the global economy.  The 
American economy’s heavy reliance on trade with the Northeast Asian nations 
would be severely and negatively impacted. 
A second devastating effect for the United States if reunification were to 
occur under a gradual process is a possible strong alliance with China.  It has 
become more apparent that there is rising anti-American tension in South Korea 
regarding the military basing on the peninsula and Washington’s policies toward 
North Korea.  Once Korea has unified, it will no longer need to follow the policies 
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given by their American “big brother”.233  Unified Korea might adopt a pro-China 
policy which would hurt American influence over the region.  A stipulation that 
China and North Korea might request prior to reunification is the complete 
removal of American forces from the peninsula.  This has been discussed earlier.  
However, it is estimated that for Seoul to match what the American forces have 
provided for their security, they would have to double their defense spending.234  
While they will no longer have a North Korean threat, they will need to defend 
against external powers.  If Seoul were to decide that they should match the 
military capabilities that the United States provided, this will be an immense 
amount of spending that could go toward rebuilding the infrastructure of the 
unified nation.  In this case Seoul might turn towards China to either provide their 
external security or provide them with the currency to fund their military.  Either 
way, China might be able to restore its traditional relationship over the Korean 
peninsula while the United States could be pushed out both diplomatically and 
economically. 
F. NATIONAL OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
1.   United States Factors to Shape Future Korea 
The United States’ interests in Korea are very similar to how they view the 
rest of their interests in Asia.  With a military and a “special” relationship with 
Korea providing the foothold to the rest of Asia, the United States is able to 
prosper from the growing economy and free trade in this region.  Because of this 
great capacity for foreign trade and investments, the United States will face three 
great challenges in both a unified Korea and the rest of Asia.  The first challenge 
is preventing an arms race.  Rising nationalism, rising defense budgets, and 
decreasing U.S influence in the region will lead Asian rivals to pursue a nuclear 
program.  Another challenge will be the asymmetric threats that will target the 
Asian economies and the American reliance on free trade in that region.  Lastly, 
with the growth within China and Japan there could be a challenge to American 
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privileges in Asia.235   The U.S must remain strong in this region by maintaining a 
strong influence over a unified Korea and maintaining an American presence on 
the peninsula. 
Another elemental concern for United States Korean reunification policy is 
the economic concerns that will follow with an already deteriorated North.  Korea 
has become vital to the U.S. for two important reasons.  First off, they are a key 
trading partner.  In 1997, South Korea was the 7th largest trading partner with the 
United States surpassing every NATO ally except Germany and the UK.236  They 
have also become a supporter on the peninsula of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the global trading system.  Korea would face economic problems with 
unification that might hinder their partnership in global trade and bring on 
massive changes in those countries affected.  Not only does South Korea serve 
United States economic interests, but it plays an important role in China, Japan, 
and the rest of Southeast Asia.  South Korea remains the third largest economy 
in Asia.  A reunification of the Korean peninsula would greatly impact the 
economic interests of the United States and Asia while possibly severely 
deteriorating the economic system in the South.  The major concern will be South 
Korea’s ability to fund the extremely expensive venture of unification.  There will 
be great strains placed on the Korean economy and the United States will suffer 
as well.  American exports will face obstacles on the Korean peninsula:  poorer 
consumers will purchase fewer goods; the Won will be depressed causing 
American products to be a lot more expensive than Korean products; and rising 
Korean nationalism along with the desire for a quick fix will carry impending trade 
barriers.237  More countries would reallocate foreign investment that might have 
been spent elsewhere, such as Russia and China, toward the economic 
upheaval on the peninsula.  This in turn will impact the Russian and Chinese 
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governments that count on that investment to prosper and not stagnate.238  
South Korea’s own chaebols will invest their own funds in the former North Korea 
rather than elsewhere, affecting the United States and other Asian investments.   
Another aspect of Korean unification will be the funding required for a new 
infrastructure and the mass exodus and famine of the North Korean people.  First 
off, a new infrastructure requires rebuilding the North Korean economy all over 
again.  Workers will need to be retrained and facilities will need to be replaced.  
Facilities which were built with Russian aid are so decayed that they have been 
shut down rather than fixed.  This will place demands upon a major portion of the 
South Korean investments and funds going towards the rebuilding of the 
infrastructure.  Also, the South, as well as China, will have to contend with an 
estimated four million refugees that might flee into the newly opened 
countries.239  Suffering from famine and chronic diseases, a whole generation of 
people will place a giant strain on a united Korean economy.  
The United States must also realize how important it is to maintain a 
security interest on the peninsula while also dismantling the nuclear program in 
the North.  Korea serves as an essential piece of the Asian puzzle.  First off, the 
United States needs to ensure that the Asian region remains neighborly and 
there is no conflict.  Any instability would threaten Washington’s influence in the 
region as well as their economic interests.  Secondly, Korea is a test to prove the 
American resolve for the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.  The United States will 
stand firm in obtaining their seat in any Asian regional negotiations.  Lastly, it is in 
the interest of the United States to maintain a non-nuclear Korea for their security 
as well as the rest of Asia.  A nuclear Korea might cause Japan and other Asian 
countries to feel threatened and build their own nuclear programs as well.240  
Nuclear disarmament remains a scorching issue within the United States and the 
major powers involved in the Six Party Talks.  North Korea has admitted to 
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Washington officials that they have a nuclear program, however there still is no 
proof of the actual program in the North.  Both China and Japan are interested in 
the Beijing talks to shut down a northern nuclear program.  China desires to 
remain the regional hegemon and a unified nuclear Korea would threaten their 
power.  Japan would also feel threatened with a nuclear unified Korea, placing 
them in the position to build their own nuclear program.  The United States, 
under direct verbal attack from the North Korean government, fears the North 
Koreans using a nuclear weapon or a rogue terrorist getting their hands on it.  
Nuclear discussions have definitely been in the forefront of the dilemmas in 
reunification and need to be continued and resolved prior to the United States 
approval of any further action.  A unified Korea would intimidate the security that 
already exists in Asia.  The United States will need to balance out security 
objectives with a unified Korea that will benefit the peninsula as well as the other 
Asian nations.  The Korean peninsula has served as a buffer state for most of 
Asia.  Serving as a direct route to China, Japan, and Russia, they have tempered 
the peace and maintained a balance in Asia.  Upon unification, there will be a 
great sense of uncertainty with the new nation state.  China will be most 
interested in expanding their influence into the peninsula at the expense of the 
other great powers.   If the United States is involved militarily or politically in the 
region, this Chinese influence will pose a security problem. 
A last concern that the United States will need to consider is a possible 
break of the “special security relationship” with the South.  The relationship with 
South Korea exists because of two commitments, forward deployed troops and 
the extension of the American nuclear umbrella.241  A loss of this special 
relationship would lose American resolve in the Pacific, a steadying role for 
Korea, and a non-nuclear peninsula.  The South Korean public has recently 
advocated decreasing the American presence and influence on the peninsula.  
Some new young bureaucrats who will run the country in the future tend to forget 
that it was because of American help in the Korean War that they are not in 
similar conditions of North Korean squalor and famine.  In conclusion, losing the 
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“special” relationship will severely detriment the United States’ influence over 
Korea and the rest of Asia. 
2.   Best Case Scenario 
American leaders in Washington have been viewed by the two Korean 
states as “dragging their feet” in order to continue American influence over the 
South Koreans while the two states are divided.  It is not preposterous to believe 
that “off the record” the United States would not be interested in Korean 
reunification since it might prompt total withdrawal of American troops, the end of 
the special security role and influence in Northeast Asia, and a decrease of trade 
with one of the United States’ major economic partners.242  Despite this belief, 
the United States must outwardly support their South Korean “little brother” in 
their reunification efforts.  If they are to support reunification, Washington would 
like to have the best case scenario for reunification to support the United States’ 
goals and interests on the peninsula.  Washington’s interests for the Korean 
peninsula following unification are for a “stable, non-nuclear, liberal-democratic, 
free market peninsula allied with the United States”.243  The stability of the 
peninsula would be controlled with strong political and civil control operating 
under a sturdy government and rule of law and preventing illicit activities such as 
drug trafficking and terrorism.  There would be open channels of communication 
to work out the problems associated with transition in the north.  Third-party 
involvement under a multinational flag such as the United Nations would be 
welcomed for appropriate action.  The refugees would be manageable and 
limited while adequate aid is provided for the citizens that are malnourished and 
need medical treatment.  The peninsula would reunify under the premise that 
they will be a “non-nuclear” power, which would also encompass all forms of 
weapons of mass destruction.244  This would be important to prevent an 
escalating arms race in the region.  Lastly, the “democratic, market-oriented” 
state would require that the peninsula be developed with the same principles                                             
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which the ROK incorporates, such as the following:  rule of law, civil liberties, 
elections among free parties, private property, and free market capitalism.245  If 
this best case scenario were to occur, the United States would prosper from 
retaining their influence on the peninsula and keeping their interests at hand. 
3.   Worst Case Scenario 
A scenario which would have the worst possible outcomes for the United 
States would have one major factor present throughout, a pro-China view.  While 
the United States currently has a working relationship with China, it is possible 
that China’s goal to modernize and develop their military will lead to the 
“unbalancing” of powers in the region.  If Korea were to align with China’s 
developing nation, it would push American influence off of the peninsula and 
possibly out of the Northeast Asian region.  Another factor of this scenario would 
be reunification without the prior termination of the North Korean nuclear 
program.  Once reunification has taken place a unified Korea would pose a 
security threat to Japan and China.  This would be grounds for an emerging 
Japanese military and nuclear program to develop in the region.  Under this 
scenario, an arms race could ensue as a result of separation from the United 
States and a unified Korea’s need to show that they are a developed nation in 
the international community.  If this were to happen, the United States will not 
have the influence or special alliance to control the escalation. 
4.   Policy Approaches  
During the Clinton administration, the President had directed his special 
advisor, William Perry, to review the policy of the United States towards North 
Korea.  After visiting North Korea and meeting with their leaders, Perry wrote his 
report.  His review is important since it provides a great background to a policy 
which will benefit South Korea and North Korea, which in turn will enable the 
United States to maintain their influence upon reunification.  Dr. Perry stated that 
if North Korea rejects this policy, then the United States will need to take 
appropriate measures to protect American security as well as that of their 
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allies.246  By acquiring nuclear weapons, Perry stated that North Korea would 
threaten the security of South Korea, the United States, and neighboring Asian 
nations.  Feeling threatened by a nuclear state, there would be a possible spark 
in an arms race in eastern Asia.  Perry concluded that it was urgent to end this 
nuclear program in North Korea and keep it contained so that nothing could stem 
out of control.  Based on this strategy, he formulated three facts which the United 
States needs to follow.  First off, United States policy must acknowledge that 
there is no regime change in North Korea in sight.247  Policy must be based on 
the Pyongyang regime that is in power and not making policy based on the 
possibility of a new leader.  The second fact that must be considered before 
making American policy is that a war would be extremely destructive.  While only 
minimum forces are sustained in South Korea, more American as well as Allied 
forces would be sent to the peninsula to fight a war against the North.  Both 
North and South Korean infrastructure would suffer as a result of a war and the 
international economy would suffer in rebuilding the Korean infrastructure.248  
Lastly, while there are many critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework, it has done 
its job in freezing the plutonium production in Yongbyon.249  This point is an item 
of contention since North Korea has recently admitted to restarting their nuclear 
facilities.  However, if the United States were to make a similar policy as the 1994 
Agreement in which aid and energy packages were given in exchange for the 
termination of the nuclear programs, it would have the best possible chance to 
dismantle the facilities. 
Using these key findings, the Perry report recommended a Two-Path 
Strategy for dealing with North Korea with five key policy recommendations.  
First, the U.S. should adopt a “comprehensive and integrated approach to the 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons.”  Second, it should “create a strengthened mechanism 
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within the U.S. government for carrying out North Korea policy”.  Third, continue 
the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) that was established to 
manage policy toward the DPRK.  Fourth, “take steps to create a sustainable, 
bipartisan, long-term outlook toward the problem of North Korea”.250  The last 
key recommendation was to approve a plan dealing with a DPRK provocation.  
While the U.S. supports the plan to work out a diplomatic solution to freezing the 
nuclear weapons program in North Korea, it is important to inform Pyongyang 
that by breaking the provisions of a future agreement, they would pay a heavy 
penalty. 
Other than taking care of North Korea’s nuclear program, the United 
States can help achieve a limited form of peaceful “regime change” in North 
Korea by enhancing regional stability and still maintaining their influence over the 
peninsula.251  In order to do this Washington should begin the normalization of 
relations with North Korea and removing them from the “Axis of Evil” and terrorist 
nation lists.  Washington should stress that their military presence, even though 
very minimal, should be maintained on the peninsula to protect it from regional 
factionalism and a regional arms race.  The United States should establish a 
senior “special advisor” to the president or secretary of state whose job is to 
create and implement policy towards Korean reunification.252  This would prove 
to the Koreans that Washington believes that unification is important to American 
policy.  Lastly, they should stress a multinational forum in which China, Russia, 
Japan, and the United States all have a say in the reunification efforts.  This  
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policy might stress the multinational forum rather than a unilateral movement 
towards China.  If American policy were to reform so that it would aid the South 
Koreans in their reunification efforts, they would have the possibility of 
maintaining leverage over a unified Korea.  Despite Washington’s approach of 
dragging out the process of reunification, a unified Korea could have great 




A. KOREA WILL REUNIFY 
1. Summary of the Three Scenarios 
The three scenarios which have been discussed in great detail in chapter 
one fall into one of two categories:  a “hard landing” or a “soft landing”.  The first 
category, “hard landing”, is a result of a rapid process in which Korean 
reunification by a war or a collapse would occur.  In other words, the scenario 
would take place so quickly that it would not permit South Korea and the other 
involved international players to fully prepare for the best possible results 
applicable to the Korean peninsula.  By stating “best possible results”, one 
assumes that Korean reunification could take place with the least amount of 
problems, whether they are economic, political, domestic, or external issues.  
The second category, a “gradual process” or a “soft-landing”, would occur as a 
result of the multilateral and inter-Korean diplomatic approach.  This scenario is 
based on the idea that through a gradual process the two Korean states, along 
with the international powers, will be able to work out a suitable reunification 
policy which all players involved would support.   
While a gradual approach to reunification has the possibility of taking 
anywhere from five to twenty years to accomplish, the general goal for North and 
South Korea is that a diplomatic approach will reach the eventual consolidation of 
one nation of the Korean brethren.  China, Japan, and the United States are 
vocal in their show of support for Korean reunification. However, each one of 
them will lose some sort of influence over the peninsula once it has reunified.  If 
they could, they would support the status quo and maintain the leverage that they 
already have obtained.  This is impossible to do without risking current relations 
with the two Korean states and future relations with unified Korea.  Therefore, by 
supporting a gradual reunification process, the three nations will be able to take 
their time to plan for the future possibilities along the Korean peninsula, as well 
as hope that the two systems might never be able to come to an agreement.  The 
only exception to this is Russia.  Russia’s loss is minimal compared to the other 
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powers.  They have the possibility of gaining a great deal with unification of the 
Korean state.  While Russia supports a long term diplomatic approach, Moscow 
is willing to work diligently towards the goal of reunification.  In the end, each 
power realizes that Korea will be a future unified factor in the global economy.  
Therefore, they will continue in their support of Korean unification so that 
afterwards they will have leverage throughout the peninsula. 
2. Which Scenario Will Guide Reunification 
Prior to unification, the two Korean states have the pressing problem of 
solving the nuclear crisis inside Pyongyang.  Also, all powers involved in the 
Beijing-based Six-Power Talks intend to establish a peaceful Korean peninsula 
before negotiations for reunification can be seriously discussed.  Since the latest 
round of talks in August 2005, there have been no agreements to dismantle or 
concede to a civilian controlled nuclear program.  The North Koreans are known 
to ask for more concessions in order to “ratchet up the stakes” while never fully 
intending for the other side to comply.  North Korea will do this so the United 
States can look like they are not supporting peaceful means to dismantlement, 
while the North Koreans can safely retain the ultimate guarantee to their security.  
They have done this many times in the past.  In 1991, the North Koreans claimed 
that their nuclear program was based on the American nuclear weapons on the 
peninsula.  When the United States removed their nuclear weapons as part of a 
reconfiguration of forces, the North Koreans shifted their demands and asked for 
access to both South Korean and American military facilities in order to confirm 
the withdrawal.253  More recently North Korea has asked for the United States’ 
recognition of their state through bilateral negotiations.  In July and August 2005, 
the two states met, in the context of the Six-Party Talks, and discussed the 
problems only for North Korea to “ratchet up the stakes” again and ask for 
civilian-energy use of their nuclear reactors.  The contention here is that Kim 
Jong-il will never willingly dismantle the North Korean nuclear program while he 
is in power.  The main reason for this is that his regime feels threatened by the 
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United States.  Seoul desires to maintain their economy and political system 
upon reunification.  It is not in the interest of South Koreans to place the 
peninsula under the control of a communist dictator.  Conversely, it is assumed 
that Kim Jong-il will not negotiate away his position of control through multilateral 
and inter-Korean diplomacy.  Also, he would not shorten his reign by attacking 
South Korea or Japan.  Therefore, if no agreement can be reached while the two 
sides are at an impasse, reunification will take an extensive amount of time while 
the peninsula remains at the status quo.   
So what if Kim Jong-il’s security threat perceptions were taken away?  If 
the United States were to sign a declaration of nonaggression, Kim Jong-il would 
probably still feel threatened and not want to dismantle the nuclear program.  The 
people of North Korea, although under a closed society, will eventually desire to 
get out from under the strict controls of the dictatorship.  As of late 2004, it was 
estimated that at least 30 percent of the North Korean population within working 
age was either unemployed or under-employed.  Some of the people who did 
receive salaries are receiving a paycheck below the subsistence levels.  
Currency inflation within the state has sent food prices sky-high.  Families spend 
up to 80 percent of an income just for food.254  The CIA estimates that out of a 
population of about 22.7 million people, 6.5 million of them are at risk of 
starvation.  The North Korean people are suffering from the policies of 
Pyongyang.  By retaining a nuclear program, Kim Jong-il can use it to retain 
leverage over his decaying society.  Kim can use his nuclear threat to blackmail 
the international arena to provide food aid, medical supplies, and the 
reconstruction of their infrastructure.  There is a growing social instability among 
the people that, without this leverage, could lead to the loss of political control.  
This instability is caused by the masses of people at the subsistence levels, 
bureaucrats traveling abroad and becoming aware of their state’s shortcomings, 
the middle class which is obtaining more opportunities to study outside of North 
Korea, and the increase of refugees yearning for better conditions.  A call for 
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reforms in the economy will be sought which is inconsistent with the ideological, 
political, and power structure of Kim Jong-il. 255  The dependence on their leader 
is not consistent with economic reforms which will make the people less 
dependent on the state.  A former Kim Il-sung University Professor, Cho Myung-
chul has been quoted saying that there is a similar generational clash in North 
Korea as there is in the South.  The older generation still places emphasis on 
security, while the younger generation who have studied abroad in China, 
Russia, and even further, see their state’s need for economic reforms.256  This 
gap will be present in the future as the generation takes over the positions of 
leadership and desires reform in their state. 
Consequently through a gradual process, the contention here is that the 
North Korean people will desire to have more economic reforms in their society.  
Some factions within the government would support such a call for reforms if they 
are able to oust Kim Jong-il and retain the position of leadership for themselves.  
Getting Kim Jong-il out of power will be an important part of this process since 
the factions would be in personal jeopardy if they called for reform and Kim was 
still in control of the state.  Therefore, the North Korean state would “crumble 
from above” as factions within Pyongyang try to peacefully oust Kim Jong-il, with 
the support of the people.  The massive portion of the population that is 
susceptible to famine while Kim Jong-il continues to feed and control his military 
will support the overthrow of the current regime.  This scenario might not occur 
until Kim Jong-il is about to relinquish power to one of his family members.  
Therefore, the conclusion here is the collapse of the political system within the 
North Korean government will initiate the reunification of the Korean peninsula 
primarily because Kim Jong-il will not reunify under more peaceful terms since it 
would mean relinquishing his position and control over the society. 
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B. MAJOR POWER INFLUENCE 
China while suffering from the mass exodus of Korean refugees will 
benefit the greatest from this collapse scenario because they will retain the most 
leverage compared to all of the other major powers.  Their historical ties to both 
of the Korean states lend a helping hand compared to the United States which is 
viewed as an outside Westerner.  Also, South Korea and the United States are 
not as close as they once were.  An example of this is the ROK’s willingness to 
go against Washington’s policy toward the Six-Party Talks and support North 
Korea’s desire to maintain their nuclear reactors for energy usage.  While 
Pyongyang and Beijing are not as close as they once used to be during the Cold 
War, there is no closer ally to the North Korean people than the Chinese.  
Therefore, just based on relationships, China would acquire greater leverage 
compared to Japan, Russia, and the United States, since South Korea will desire 
to distance themselves from their “big brother” in Washington.   
A second issue that China will use to gain leverage over the unified Korea 
is through the economy.  During the years since China’s economic reformation, 
they have been trying to push Pyongyang toward transformation as well.   Even 
though North Korea has only activated minor reforms, it has been the Chinese 
model of the economy that was used.  Kim Jong-il authorized the creation of 
special economic zones that are advocated by the Chinese model.  China alone 
has had the largest amount of economic influence over North Korea, while trade 
with South Korea has increased over the years.257  Since Chinese businessmen 
are allowed within the North Korean borders, they already have relationships with 
their Korean partners as they directly invest in the state.  Lastly, since reform has 
not taken hold, North Korea is dependent on the aid received from China and 
South Korea.  Following a collapse, it is plausible that the new leadership would 
seek Chinese help to rebuild their society while reunifying with the South Korean 
state. 
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Finally, the Chinese military has a strong traditional relationship with the 
North Korean military.  This will serve as another aspect in which China will gain 
the maximum influence over a reunified Korea.  Both militaries have given 
support to one another, the North Koreans aided during the Chinese Civil War 
while the Chinese supported North Korea during the Korean War.  Beijing has 
had contact with the North Korean elites through the military and multiple military 
technology transfers.258  Since the fall of 2003, China has been training for a 
potential flood of refugees into their borders as a result of a collapse or war.  
Instead of meeting the refugees in China, Chinese forces could use their 
alliances within North Korea to push inside the Korean borders and station their 
refugee camps inside the border.  This action could then set up the Chinese 
forces to follow up into the major cities and help control the peace.  If China’s 
military supports the reunification efforts by maintaining a peaceful situation on 
the peninsula, the United States would not be involved in this crucial step 
towards reunification.   
In conclusion, based on the circumstances assessed here Kim Jong-il will 
not be able to negotiate away his nuclear program, his only security against an 
American-led preemptive strike to oust his regime.  However, he is not prepared 
to strike out against the South Korean state since the American military 
superiority would take out his regime.  Also, there is no way that Kim Jong-il will 
agree to the demands of reunification set forth by Seoul, a policy that would take 
control away from his position as well.  Therefore, the contention here is that he 
will use his nuclear program as a way to gain concessions from the international 
community while never reforming the closed society.  This will not be enough to 
lessen the extreme hardships that the North Korean people are facing.  At some 
point in the future, the North Korean people will have had enough and will 
support a faction within the government to take control away from Kim Jong-il or  
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his lineal successor.  At this point, the North Korean state will begin to crumble 
and Seoul will need to rapidly begin the reunification process to support their 
North Korean brethren.  Once this happens China will be the likely choice to 
provide the maximum economic, military, and cultural benefits to the affected 
peninsula.  Based on the support provided and the relations during the 
reunification process, once everything is all settled, China will gain maximum 
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